# Democratic Fitness Indicator (DFI)

## Scoring Guidelines - ELECTIONS 

---

## 1. Introduction and Methodology

### Definition and Purpose

The Democratic Fitness Indicator (DFI) measures how effectively citizens can exercise their democratic power at the national level, with emphasis on direct participation and institutional safeguards. This index operationalizes democracy defined as: "a model of governance where people are in charge of decision-making, based on recognizing the inherent freedom of every person, their worthiness and the capacity for self-determination."

### Overall Structure

DFI consists of seven weighted categories, totaling 100%:

1. Elections (25%)
2. Holding Politicians Accountable (15%)
3. Parliamentary Legislative Initiative (5%)
4. Referenda (10%)
5. Citizens' Assemblies (15%)
6. Safeguards (15%)
7. Ability to Change the Constitution (15%)


## 2. Documentation Standards

### Source Documentation Hierarchy

For each scored component, documentation should follow this hierarchy:

1. Constitutional provisions (primary)
2. Organic laws or statutes governing the institution
3. Regular legislation
4. Established case law or judicial interpretations
5. Procedural rules and regulations
6. When necessary, credible secondary sources

### Translation Protocol

For non-English sources:
1. Provide the original text in source language
2. Include official translation if available
3. If using machine translation, note this explicitly
4. For key legal terminology, verify against established international glossaries

---

## 3. Category-Specific Scoring Protocols

### 3.1 Elections (25%)

When scoring electoral systems, follow these protocols:

#### 3.1.1 Non-Presidential Systems
- Remove the Presidential Election Methods component (25% of category)
- Redistribute its weight proportionally to other components
- Calculate as: Original score / Applicable percentage × 100

**Example Redistribution:**
- Original weights: Campaign Finance (20%), District Design (20%), Vote Counting (25%), Threshold (10%) = 75%
- New total: 100%
- Multiplier: 100/75 = 1.3333
- Revised weights:
  - Campaign Finance: 20% × 1.3333 = 26.666%
  - District Design: 20% × 1.3333 = 26.666%
  - Vote Counting: 25% × 1.3333 = 33.3325%
  - Threshold: 10% × 1.3333 = 13.333%

#### 3.1.2 Electoral Threshold Applicability
- Only score for PR or MMP systems
- For mixed non-compensatory systems, prorate based on PR seat proportion
- For non-applicable systems, redistribute threshold weight among remaining components

**Implementation Steps:**
1. Identify electoral system type
2. Determine threshold applicability
3. For applicable systems: score normally
4. For non-applicable systems: redistribute weight
5. For mixed systems: prorate based on PR seat proportion

#### 3.1.3 Transparency Requirements Assessment for Campaign Donations

##### Evaluating the Disclosure Threshold Relative to Minimum Wage

When assessing the "Transparency Requirements for Campaign Donations" component under Campaign Finance Controls, a key distinguishing factor is the donation threshold that triggers public disclosure requirements. The DFI methodology establishes a clear benchmark: disclosure thresholds should be evaluated against the country's monthly minimum wage.

**Calculation Steps:**
1. Determine the country's hourly minimum wage per **General Guidelines — Hourly Minimum Wage Proxy** (the four-rung cascade covers countries without a statutory minimum wage; rung 1 statutory hourly, rung 2 monthly÷160, rung 3 lowest public clerical, rung 4 60% of public-administration average). The monthly equivalent for §1.1.5 benchmarking is hourly × 160.
2. Calculate 10% of this monthly minimum wage (this is the benchmark threshold)
3. Identify the country's legal disclosure threshold for political donations
4. Compare the legal threshold against the 10% benchmark

**Classification Standards:**
- **Full public disclosure (10 points)**: Requires ALL of the following:
  - Disclosure threshold is at or below 10% of monthly minimum wage
  - Complete donor identification (name, geographic identifier, registration codes)
  - Complete donation details (amount, date, form)
  - Publicly accessible, searchable database

- **Partial disclosure (5 points)**: When the system has these characteristics:
  - Disclosure threshold exceeds 10% of monthly minimum wage but is below 100% of monthly minimum wage, OR
  - Most quality criteria for full disclosure are met, but some elements are limited

- **Limited disclosure (0 points)**: When ANY of these limitations exist:
  - Minimum donor identification only (name only, without geographic information)
  - Disclosure threshold exceeds 100% of monthly minimum wage
  - Limited format accessibility (non-searchable formats)

- **No disclosure (-20% penalty)**: When ANY of these conditions apply:
  - No legal requirements for public disclosure
  - Information collected but not publicly accessible
  - Unenforced legal requirements

**Documentation Requirements:**
```
TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT:
Monthly minimum wage: [Amount] ([Currency])
10% threshold benchmark: [Amount] ([Currency])
Legal disclosure threshold: [Amount] ([Currency])
Comparison: Legal threshold is [X%] of monthly minimum wage
Additional criteria assessment:
- Donor identification: [Full/Partial/Minimal]
- Donation details: [Complete/Limited]
- Public accessibility: [Searchable database/Limited access/None]
Classification: [Full/Partial/Limited/None] ([Points]/10)
```

**Example: United Kingdom**
```
TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT:
Monthly minimum wage: £1,600 (GBP)
10% threshold benchmark: £160 (GBP)
Legal disclosure threshold: £7,500 (GBP)
Comparison: Legal threshold is 468.75% of monthly minimum wage
Additional criteria assessment:
- Donor identification: Full (name, address)
- Donation details: Complete (amount, date, form)
- Public accessibility: Searchable database (Electoral Commission)
Classification: Limited disclosure (0/10)
```

### 3.1.4 Campaign Finance Controls Assessment

When evaluating the Campaign Finance Controls component of the Elections category, follow these specific guidelines to ensure consistent assessment:

#### 3.1.4.1 Campaign Account Structure (max. 5 points)

This component evaluates whether campaign spending is channeled through official, regulated campaign accounts:

- **All spending through official campaign account (5 points)**: The legal framework requires all campaign-related spending to flow through officially designated campaign accounts subject to regulation and oversight.

- **Mixed system with both official and other channels (0 points)**: The system allows some campaign spending through official accounts while permitting other channels with less oversight.

- **No official account requirement (-20% penalty for elections category)**: No legal requirement exists for campaign spending to flow through designated accounts, significantly reducing transparency and accountability.

#### 3.1.4.2 Donation Restrictions (max. 28 points)

This component addresses limitations on who can fund political campaigns and in what amounts:

##### a) Foreign Source Donations (max. 8 points)

- **Official Campaign Account**:
  * Completely prohibited (4 points): Foreign donations to official campaign accounts are explicitly prohibited by law
  * Partially restricted (0 points): Some restrictions exist but with significant exceptions
  * Allowed (-25% penalty for elections category): Foreign funding of official campaign accounts is permitted

- **Other Campaign Channels**:
  * Completely prohibited (4 points): Foreign donations through alternative channels (PACs, foundations, etc.) are explicitly prohibited
  * Partially restricted (0 points): Some restrictions exist but with significant exceptions
  * Allowed (-25% penalty for elections category): Foreign funding through alternative channels is permitted

- **Loopholes Exist (-25% penalty for elections category)**: This applies when the legal framework formally prohibits foreign donations but contains significant exceptions, enforcement gaps, or technical workarounds that enable foreign influence. Examples include: domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations allowed to make political contributions; foreign entities channeling money through opaque nonprofit organizations or shell companies.

**Note**: The maximum penalty for Foreign Source Donations is -25% for the elections category, regardless of how many conditions trigger penalties. For example, if foreign donations are allowed through official accounts AND other campaign channels, the total penalty remains -25%, not -50%.

**Note**: For the final score write: "FOREIGN DONATION LOOPHOLE IDENTIFIED: " and provide 1-2 sentences of a brief rationale. 

##### b) Corporate Donations (max. 12 points)

- **Official Campaign Account**:
  * Completely prohibited (4 points): Corporate donations to official campaign accounts are explicitly prohibited
  * Limited with caps (0 points): Corporate donations are permitted but subject to monetary limits
  * Unrestricted (-25% penalty for elections category): Corporate donations to official campaign accounts are unlimited

- **Other Campaign Channels**:
  * Completely prohibited (4 points): Corporate donations through alternative channels are explicitly prohibited
  * Limited with caps (0 points): Corporate donations are permitted but subject to monetary limits
  * Unrestricted (-25% penalty for elections category): Corporate donations through alternative channels are unlimited

- **Non-Election Political Activities**:
  * Prohibited (4 points): Corporations cannot fund non-election political activities (lobbying, issue advocacy, etc.)
  * Restricted (0 points): Corporate funding of non-election political activities is limited
  * Allowed (-25% penalty for elections category): Corporations can fund non-election political activities without significant restrictions

**Note**: If corporate donations are allowed through both the official campaign account and other campaign channels, only a single penalty of -25% applies. This limitation does not apply to penalties from the Non-Election Political Activities component, which may apply additively.

##### c) Individual Donation Limits (max. 8 points)

- **To Presidential Candidates (across all channels)**:
  * Below 3 average monthly salaries/year (4 points): Strict limits that maintain democratic balance
  * 3-5 average monthly salaries/year (2 points): Moderate limits that provide some protection
  * Above 5 average monthly salaries/year (0 points): Weak limits that allow significant donor influence
  * No limit (-25% penalty for elections category): Unlimited individual donations enabling outsized influence

- **To Political Parties (across all channels)**:
  * Below 3 average monthly salaries/year (4 points): Strict limits that maintain democratic balance
  * 3-5 average monthly salaries/year (2 points): Moderate limits that provide some protection
  * Above 5 average monthly salaries/year (0 points): Weak limits that allow significant donor influence
  * No limit (-25% penalty for elections category): Unlimited individual donations enabling outsized influence

#### 3.1.4.3 Campaign Spending Controls (max. 30 points)

This component evaluates limitations on how much can be spent in campaigns:

- **Presidential Election Campaigns (where applicable, across all channels)**
  * Strict limits (up to 0.0015% of voting population × GDP per capita): 10 points
  * Soft caps (0.0015% - 0.003% of voting population × GDP per capita): 5 points
  * Low caps (above 0.003% of voting population × GDP per capita): 0 points
  * No limits (-25% penalty for elections category): Unlimited spending allowed

- **Parliamentary Election Campaigns (across all channels)**
  * **Individual Candidate Spending**
    * Strict limits (up to [(1.1 × GDP per capita) + (constituency population × 0.000005 × GDP per capita)]): 10 points
    * Soft caps (up to 2x strict limits): 5 points
    * Low caps (above 2x strict limits): 0 points
    * No limits (-25% penalty for elections category): Unlimited candidate spending allowed

  * **Political Party Campaign Spending**
    * Strict limits (up to [(1.1 × GDP per capita) + (constituency population × 0.000005 × GDP per capita)]): 10 points
    * Soft caps (up to 2x strict limits): 5 points
    * Low caps (above 2x strict limits): 0 points
    * No limits (-25% penalty for elections category): Unlimited party spending allowed

#### 3.1.4.4 Public Funding Systems (max. 30 points)


Please use main DFI framework.


### 3.1.6 Evaluating Upper Houses in Electoral District Design

#### 3.1.6.1 Overview

Upper houses (senates, councils of states, etc.) present unique evaluation challenges due to their varied designs across democratic systems. This section clarifies how to properly evaluate upper houses based on their constitutional design and relationship to territorial units.

#### 3.1.6.2 Classification of Upper House Types

Upper houses typically fall into one of three categories, each requiring a different evaluation approach:

##### Type 1: Upper Houses with Drawn Electoral Districts
- **Definition**: Electoral boundaries are specifically created for election purposes and can be redrawn
- **Examples**: UK House of Lords (elected members), Australian Senate (state-based but with drawn internal districts)
- **Evaluation**: Apply the full Electoral District Design methodology (Deviation from Equal Population, District Boundary Drawing, District Type Structure)

##### Type 2: Upper Houses Based on Fixed Territorial Units
- **Definition**: Representatives are elected from constitutionally defined territories (states, cantons, provinces)
- **Examples**: US Senate, German Bundesrat, Swiss Council of States
- **Evaluation**: 
  - Do NOT apply 'Deviation from Equal Population' criteria (population disparities between states/provinces are constitutional features, not democratic deficiencies)
  - Do NOT apply 'District Boundary Drawing' criteria (boundaries are fixed by constitution, not subject to redistricting)
  - DO apply the 'District Type Structure' component (e.g., whether each territorial unit elects multiple representatives proportionally or a single representative)

##### Type 3: Non-Directly Elected Upper Houses
- **Definition**: Members are appointed, indirectly elected, or selected through non-democratic means
- **Examples**: Canadian Senate, Irish Senate (partial), UK House of Lords (appointed members)
- **Evaluation**: This methodology does not apply; instead, evaluate such chambers under the appropriate 'Distortions of popular vote' section, specifically under "Upper house with an influence over legislation and majority or all members not elected directly by the people"

#### 3.1.6.3 Federal Systems Considerations

In federal systems, population disparities between states/provinces in the upper house are often intentional constitutional features designed to balance power between differently sized constituent units. These should not be penalized as democratic deficiencies when:

1. The disparities result from the constitutional structure of federalism
2. The boundaries are fixed territorial units rather than manipulable electoral districts
3. The system includes other mechanisms (typically a population-proportional lower house) to ensure democratic representation

**Example**: The United States Senate gives equal representation to all states regardless of population. This creates significant population disparities but serves the constitutional purpose of ensuring equal representation of states as political entities. This should not be evaluated as a deviation from equal population under Electoral District Design, but rather assessed under the appropriate section on federal structures.

#### 3.1.6.4 Application Guidelines

When evaluating upper houses:

1. **First, identify the upper house type** according to the classification above
2. **For Type 1 (Drawn Districts)**: Apply the full methodology
3. **For Type 2 (Fixed Territorial Units)**:
   - Skip population equality assessment
   - Skip boundary drawing assessment
   - Evaluate only the district type structure
4. **For Type 3 (Non-Directly Elected)**: Apply appropriate penalties under "Distortions of popular vote"

#### 3.1.6.5 Documentation Requirements

When documenting the evaluation of an upper house, explicitly state:

```
UPPER HOUSE TYPE: [Type 1/Type 2/Type 3]
CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS: [Citation to constitutional provisions defining the chamber]
TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE: [Description of how representatives are allocated to territories]
EVALUATION APPROACH: [Which components of the methodology are being applied and why]
```

#### 3.1.6.6 Scoring Bicameral Legislatures in Electoral District Design

##### Overview

For countries with bicameral legislatures, both houses must be evaluated separately. This section provides a standardized methodology for combining these separate evaluations into a single score for the Electoral District Design component.

##### Standard Weighting Approach

When calculating the final Electoral District Design score for bicameral systems, use the following standard weighting:

- **Lower House: 70% weight**
- **Upper House: 30% weight**

This weighting reflects the typical greater democratic importance of lower houses in most bicameral systems, while still accounting for the upper house's influence on representative democracy.

##### Calculation Formula

```
Electoral District Design Score = (Lower House Score × 0.7) + (Upper House Score × 0.3)
```

### 3.1.7 Distinguishing Constitutional Deadlock Mechanisms from Democratic Distortions

When evaluating potential distortions to electoral systems, particularly presidential powers that may affect parliament:

**Note on Constitutional Deadlock Resolution:**
Constitutional mechanisms designed to resolve specific governmental deadlocks should be distinguished from powers that distort democratic outcomes. When evaluating presidential powers to dissolve parliament or call early elections, carefully consider:

1. **Intent and Design**
   - Mechanisms specifically designed to overcome identifiable deadlocks (failure to form government, budget non-approval, repeated no-confidence votes) represent legitimate constitutional engineering, not democratic distortions.
   - Powers intended to ensure government functionality during crises should not be penalized if they include appropriate checks and limitations.

2. **Scope and Limitations**
   - Powers limited to specific, well-defined scenarios with clear procedural requirements typically do not warrant penalties.
   - Overly broad, discretionary powers with few constraints typically warrant partial or full penalties.

3. **Historical Implementation**
   - Even when constitutional provisions exist, examine how they have been implemented in practice.
   - A power used solely to resolve genuine deadlocks as constitutionally intended should not receive penalties.
   - The same power used to undermine democratic processes or electoral outcomes would warrant penalties.

4. **Procedural Safeguards**
   - The presence of meaningful consultation requirements, legislative involvement, or judicial review significantly reduces the distortionary potential of these powers.
   - Document these safeguards when explaining scoring decisions.

**Documentation Requirements:**
When deciding not to apply a penalty for powers that might otherwise appear distortionary, provide:
- Exact constitutional language defining the power and its limitations
- Clear explanation of the procedural requirements and checks on the power
- If applicable, historical examples showing the power was used as designed
- Analysis demonstrating how the power serves to maintain rather than undermine democratic function

#### 3.1.7.1 Presidential Elections Component - Classification Clarification

**Note on Presidential Election Methods Redistribution:**

For the purposes of the DFI methodology, the Presidential Election Methods component (25% of the Elections category) should be redistributed to other components in either of the following scenarios:

1. **No presidential office exists** in the country's constitutional structure.

2. **A presidential office exists but is not directly elected by citizens** through a separate electoral process. This includes, but is not limited to:
   - Presidents selected by the parliament or legislature
   - Presidents appointed by a council or committee
   - Ceremonial presidents in parliamentary systems who are elected indirectly
   - Rotating presidencies within a council or collective executive body
   - Presidents elected by an electoral college without direct citizen participation

The key determining factor is whether citizens directly participate in a separate election process to select the president. If no such direct election occurs, the Presidential Election Methods component should be redistributed.

##### Examples for Clarification:

- **United States**: Citizens directly elect the president (via Electoral College). Presidential Election Methods component applies.
  
- **France**: Citizens directly elect the president. Presidential Election Methods component applies.
  
- **Germany**: President is elected by a special assembly (Federal Convention). Presidential Election Methods component should be redistributed.
  
- **Switzerland**: President is selected by the Federal Assembly from among Federal Council members. Presidential Election Methods component should be redistributed.
  
- **United Kingdom**: No president; monarch is head of state, Prime Minister is head of government selected by parliamentary process. Presidential Election Methods component should be redistributed.

##### Redistribution Calculation:

When redistribution is required, the 25% weight of the Presidential Election Methods component should be proportionally distributed among the remaining components of the Elections category, maintaining their relative weights to each other:

1. Calculate the total weight of remaining components: 75% (Campaign Finance Controls 20% + Electoral District Design 20% + Vote Counting Methods 25% + Electoral Threshold 10%)
2. Apply multiplier: 100/75 = 1.33
3. Recalculate weights:
   - Campaign Finance Controls: 20% × 1.33 = 26.7%
   - Electoral District Design: 20% × 1.33 = 26.7%
   - Vote Counting Methods: 25% × 1.33 = 33.3%
   - Electoral Threshold: 10% × 1.33 = 13.3%

This clarification ensures consistent application of the DFI methodology across different political systems and prevents misclassification of countries with indirect presidential selection mechanisms.

### 3.1.8 Applying Penalties

Penalties are a critical component of the DFI methodology, designed to highlight significant structural weaknesses in democratic systems. This section clarifies the procedure for applying penalties and provides a standardized format for documentation.

#### 3.1.8.1 Penalty Calculation Procedure

1. **Identify All Applicable Penalties**: For each category, list all penalties triggered by the country's institutional arrangements or practices.

2. **Sum All Applicable Penalties**: Add all percentage penalties together, even if they exceed 100%.

3. **Apply the Minimum Score Rule**: If the total penalties exceed 100%, the category score becomes 0%. The minimum category score is always 0%, even when penalties would mathematically result in a negative score.

4. **Documentation Format**: List all penalties separately at the end of each category section before calculating the final category score.

#### 3.1.8.2 Example: Elections Category Penalty Calculation

Below is an example of how to document and calculate penalties for the Elections category using the updated penalty values:

```
### Penalties for Elections Category

**Penalties Identified**:
- No official account requirement: -20% for elections category
- Unrestricted corporate donations (Official): -25% for elections category
- Unrestricted corporate donations (Other): -25% for elections category
- Unrestricted corporate donations (Non-Election): -25% for elections category
- No individual donation limits (Presidential): -25% for elections category
- No individual donation limits (Parties): -25% for elections category
- No presidential spending limits: -25% for elections category
- No parliamentary candidate spending limits: -25% for elections category
- No party spending limits: -25% for elections category
- No transparency requirements: -20% for elections category

**Total Penalties**: -20% - 25% - 25% - 25% - 25% - 25% - 25% - 25% - 25% - 20% = -240%

**Application of Minimum Score Rule**: 
Since penalties exceed 100%, the Elections category score is 0%.

**Final Elections Category Score**: 0%
**Contribution to DFI**: 0% × 25% = 0.00%
```

#### 3.1.8.3 Alternative Example with Fewer Penalties

```
### Penalties for Elections Category

**Penalties Identified**:
- No official account requirement: -20% for elections category
- Limited corporate donations (Official): -25% for elections category
- No transparency requirements: -20% for elections category

**Total Penalties**: -20% - 25% - 20% = -65%

**Base Category Score**: 75%
**Adjusted Score after Penalties**: 75% - 65% = 10%

**Final Elections Category Score**: 10%
**Contribution to DFI**: 10% × 25% = 2.5%
```

#### 3.1.8.4 Distinguishing Between Penalty Types

The DFI framework includes penalties with different scopes:

1. **Category-wide penalties**: Apply to the entire category (e.g., -25% for elections category)
2. **Election-type penalties**: Apply to either parliamentary or presidential components (e.g., -25% for parliamentary elections)
3. **Component-specific penalties**: Apply only to specific subcomponents

When documenting penalties, clearly indicate which type each penalty is to ensure consistent application across different evaluators.

#### 3.1.8.5 Recommended Format for Category Scoring Sections

For clarity and consistency, each category section should follow this structure:

1. **Component Evaluations**: Score each component based on its specific criteria
2. **Base Score Calculation**: Calculate the initial category score without penalties
3. **Penalties Section**: List all applicable penalties with their individual values
4. **Total Penalty Calculation**: Sum all penalties and determine if the minimum score rule applies
5. **Final Category Score**: Calculate the adjusted score after penalties
6. **Contribution to DFI**: Calculate how this category contributes to the overall DFI score

#### 3.1.8.6 Reference Table: Elections Category Penalties

| Penalty Condition | Penalty Value | Applied To |
|-------------------|---------------|------------|
| **Campaign Finance Controls** | | |
| No official account requirement | -20% | Elections category |
| Unrestricted corporate donations (Official) | -25% | Elections category |
| Unrestricted corporate donations (Other) | -25% | Elections category |
| Unrestricted corporate donations (Non-Election) | -25% | Elections category |
| Foreign donations allowed (Official) | -25% | Elections category |
| Foreign donations allowed (Other) | -25% | Elections category |
| Foreign donation loopholes exist | -25% | Elections category |
| Individual donation limits - no limit (Presidential) | -25% | Elections category |
| Individual donation limits - no limit (Parties) | -25% | Elections category |
| Campaign spending - no limits (Presidential) | -25% | Elections category |
| Campaign spending - no limits (Individual Candidate) | -25% | Elections category |
| Campaign spending - no limits (Political Party) | -25% | Elections category |
| No disclosure of donors | -20% | Elections category |
| **Electoral Threshold** | | |
| High electoral threshold (>5%) | -10% | Elections category |
| High threshold for coalitions only (>5%) | -5% | Elections category |
| **Distortions of Popular Vote** | | |
| Electoral College overriding popular vote | -100% | Presidential elections |
| Monarch's power over PM selection | -100% | Parliamentary elections |
| Religious authorities' veto powers | -100% | Parliamentary elections |
| Military veto power over PM selection | -100% | Parliamentary elections |
| Special veto powers by ethnic/traditional leaders | -100% | Parliamentary elections |
| Unelected bodies with actual veto powers that can permanently block any legislation passed by elected representatives | -100% | Parliamentary elections |
| Unelected bodies with actual veto powers that can permanently block legislation related to regional issues passed by elected representatives | -40% | Parliamentary elections |
| Unelected bodies that can force changes to legislation against the will of elected representatives | -100% | Parliamentary elections |
| Unelected bodies where overcoming their opposition requires extraordinary measures (supermajorities, etc.) | -25% | Parliamentary elections |
| Unelected bodies that can significantly delay legislation for extended periods (over 1 year) | -25% | Parliamentary elections |
| Presidential power to arbitrarily dissolve parliament | -100% | Parliamentary elections |
| **Electoral disproportionality** | | |
| Severe disproportionality (lower house) | -100% | Parliamentary elections |
| Limited disproportionality (lower house) | -50% | Parliamentary elections |
| Severe disproportionality (upper house) | -50% | Parliamentary elections |
| Limited disproportionality (upper house) | -25% | Parliamentary elections |
| Severe disproportionality (both houses) | -100% | Parliamentary elections |
| Limited disproportionality (both houses) | -50% | Parliamentary elections |
| Severe disproportionality (single chamber) | -100% | Parliamentary elections |
| Limited disproportionality (single chamber) | -50% | Parliamentary elections |
| **Intentional gerrymandering** | | |
| Intentional gerrymandering — Present (lower house) | -100% | Parliamentary elections |
| Intentional gerrymandering — Present (upper house) | -50% | Parliamentary elections |
| Intentional gerrymandering — Present (both houses) | -100% | Parliamentary elections |
| Intentional gerrymandering — Present (single chamber) | -100% | Parliamentary elections |

**Note on Maximum Penalties**: 
- For Foreign Source Donations: The maximum penalty is -25%, regardless of how many conditions trigger penalties.
- For Corporate Donations to campaign channels: If multiple campaign channel penalties apply, the maximum is -25%.
- The Non-Election Political Activities penalty may apply additively to campaign channel penalties.

**Note**: For penalties related to "Actual use in practice (over the last 100 years)":
- When a power exists but has not been used in practice during the current constitutional order, half of the impact score applies
- When a power has been used in practice during the current constitutional order, the full impact score applies

**Important**: When multiple penalties apply to the same scope, they are summed but capped at -100%. The minimum category score is 0%, even when penalties would mathematically result in a negative score.

#### 3.1.8.7 Clarification Note:

The "No limit" penalty (-25%) applies only when there is no legal cap on donations, as defined by the absence of any statutory or regulatory limit in the country's election laws. A donation limit exceeding 5 average monthly salaries/year does not constitute "no limit" and should not trigger the -25% penalty. Instead, such cases receive 0 points.

### 3.1.9 Redistribution and Penalty Interaction Guidelines

#### 3.1.9.1 Overview

When evaluating democratic systems, assessors frequently encounter cases where both weight redistribution (due to non-applicable components) and penalty application are required within the same category. This section provides explicit guidance on the sequence of operations, calculation methods, and documentation requirements for these complex scenarios.

#### 3.1.9.2 Sequence of Operations

When both redistribution and penalties apply to a category, follow this strict sequence:

1. **Initial Component Scoring**: Calculate raw scores for all applicable components
2. **Component-Specific Penalty Application**: Apply penalties that affect specific components only
3. **Weight Redistribution**: Redistribute weights from non-applicable components to applicable ones
4. **Subtotal Calculation**: Calculate category subtotal with redistributed weights
5. **Category-Wide Penalty Application**: Apply category-wide penalties to the subtotal
6. **Election-Type Penalty Application**: Apply parliamentary or presidential election penalties
7. **Documentation**: Record each step with mathematical calculations shown

This sequence ensures consistent evaluation across different systems and prevents methodological discrepancies.

#### 3.1.9.3 Weight Redistribution Procedures

##### 3.1.9.3.1 Non-Presidential Systems

When a country lacks a presidential system (monarchy, parliamentary republic, etc.), the Presidential Election Methods component (25% of Elections) must be redistributed:

```
Step 1: Identify applicable components and their original weights
  - Campaign Finance Controls: 20%
  - Electoral District Design: 20%
  - Parliamentary Vote Counting: 25%
  - Electoral Threshold: 10% (if applicable)
  - Total applicable weight: 75% (or 65% if threshold not applicable)

Step 2: Calculate redistribution multiplier
  - Multiplier = 100 ÷ (sum of applicable component weights)
  - Example: 100 ÷ 75 = 1.3333

Step 3: Apply multiplier to each component weight
  - Campaign Finance: 20% × 1.3333 = 26.67%
  - Electoral District Design: 20% × 1.3333 = 26.67%
  - Parliamentary Vote Counting: 25% × 1.3333 = 33.33%
  - Electoral Threshold: 10% × 1.3333 = 13.33% (if applicable)

Step 4: Verify new weights sum to 100%
  - 26.67% + 26.67% + 33.33% + 13.33% = 100%
```

##### 3.1.9.3.2 Non-Applicable Electoral Threshold

For countries using First Past the Post or other non-proportional systems where Electoral Threshold is non-applicable:

```
Step 1: Remove Electoral Threshold component (10% or 13.33% if already redistributed)

Step 2: Calculate secondary redistribution multiplier
  - Multiplier = 100 ÷ (sum of remaining component weights)
  - Example with already redistributed weights: 100 ÷ 86.67 = 1.1538

Step 3: Apply secondary multiplier to remaining component weights
  - Campaign Finance: 26.67% × 1.1538 = 30.77%
  - Electoral District Design: 26.67% × 1.1538 = 30.77%
  - Parliamentary Vote Counting: 33.33% × 1.1538 = 38.46%

Step 4: Verify new weights sum to 100%
  - 30.77% + 30.77% + 38.46% = 100%
```

#### 3.1.9.4 Penalty Application After Redistribution

After weights are redistributed, penalties must be applied to the appropriate scope without exception:

##### 3.1.9.4.1 Component-Specific Penalties

Apply these penalties only to their specific components before any redistribution:

```
Example: High electoral threshold (-10% penalty)
  - Apply to Electoral Threshold component only
  - Raw Electoral Threshold score = (points earned ÷ maximum possible) × 100
  - Penalized score = Raw score - 10%
```

##### 3.1.9.4.2 Election-Type Penalties

Apply these penalties to all parliamentary or all presidential components, after redistribution:

```
Example: Unelected upper house (-50% penalty)
Step 1: Calculate sum of parliamentary component scores with redistributed weights
  - Campaign Finance: 30.77% of category × (component score %)
  - Electoral District Design: 30.77% of category × (component score %)
  - Parliamentary Vote Counting: 38.46% of category × (component score %)
  - Sum = Total parliamentary component score

Step 2: Apply penalty to parliamentary sum
  - Penalized parliamentary score = Total parliamentary score × (1 - 0.5)

Important Note: If multiple parliamentary penalties apply, sum them (capped at -100%).
If total penalties reach or exceed -100%, the parliamentary components score is 0%.
No exceptions or adjustments to this rule are permitted.
```

##### 3.1.9.4.3 Category-Wide Penalties

Apply these penalties to the entire category maximum score:

```
Example: Foreign donation loopholes (-25% for elections category)
  - Maximum category score becomes 75% instead of 100%
  - All other scores are calculated as percentages of this reduced maximum
```

#### 3.1.9.5 Documentation Format

Documentation must transparently show each step of the redistribution and penalty calculation:

```
REDISTRIBUTION CALCULATION:
Original component weights:
- Component A: X%
- Component B: Y%
- Component C: Z% (non-applicable)
- Total applicable: X% + Y% = (X+Y)%

Redistribution multiplier: 100 ÷ (X+Y) = [multiplier]
Redistributed weights:
- Component A: X% × [multiplier] = [new X%]
- Component B: Y% × [multiplier] = [new Y%]
Total: 100%

PENALTY APPLICATION:
Component scores before penalties:
- Component A: [score A%] × [new X%] = [contribution A%]
- Component B: [score B%] × [new Y%] = [contribution B%]
- Total category score before penalties: [contribution A% + contribution B%] = [total%]

Applicable penalties:
- [Penalty 1]: -[P1]% for [scope]
- [Penalty 2]: -[P2]% for [scope]
Total penalties: -[P1+P2]%, capped at -100% if applicable

Final calculation:
[Show mathematical formula and steps]
Final category score: [final%]
```

#### 3.1.9.6 Example Case Study: United Kingdom Elections

This example demonstrates the full sequence for a complex case involving both redistribution and penalties:

##### Initial Framework
- Presidential Election Methods: Non-applicable (monarchy)
- Electoral Threshold: Non-applicable (FPTP system)
- Multiple penalties affecting parliamentary components

##### Step-by-Step Calculation

```
1. INITIAL COMPONENT SCORING:
Campaign Finance Controls: 43/99 points = 43.43%
Electoral District Design: 20/40 points = 50%
Parliamentary Vote Counting: 0/20 points = 0%

2. COMPONENT-SPECIFIC PENALTIES:
None in this example

3. PRIMARY REDISTRIBUTION (Presidential → Parliamentary):
Original weights:
- Campaign Finance: 20%
- Electoral District Design: 20%
- Parliamentary Vote Counting: 25%
- Electoral Threshold: 10%
- Presidential Methods: 25% (non-applicable)
Total applicable: 75%

Redistribution multiplier: 100 ÷ 75 = 1.3333
Redistributed weights:
- Campaign Finance: 20% × 1.3333 = 26.67%
- Electoral District Design: 20% × 1.3333 = 26.67%
- Parliamentary Vote Counting: 25% × 1.3333 = 33.33%
- Electoral Threshold: 10% × 1.3333 = 13.33%

4. SECONDARY REDISTRIBUTION (Electoral Threshold):
Remaining weights:
- Campaign Finance: 26.67%
- Electoral District Design: 26.67%
- Parliamentary Vote Counting: 33.33%
- Electoral Threshold: 13.33% (non-applicable)
Total applicable: 86.67%

Secondary multiplier: 100 ÷ 86.67 = 1.1538
Final redistributed weights:
- Campaign Finance: 26.67% × 1.1538 = 30.77%
- Electoral District Design: 26.67% × 1.1538 = 30.77%
- Parliamentary Vote Counting: 33.33% × 1.1538 = 38.46%
Total: 100%

5. SUBTOTAL CALCULATION:
- Campaign Finance: 43.43% × 30.77% = 13.36%
- Electoral District Design: 50% × 30.77% = 15.39%
- Parliamentary Vote Counting: 0% × 38.46% = 0%
Parliamentary component subtotal: 28.75%

6. ELECTION-TYPE PENALTY APPLICATION:
Penalties:
- Monarch's power over PM selection: -50% (no actual use)
- Unelected upper house — significant delay: -25% (actual use)
- Severe disproportionality: -100% (Gallagher Index 23.7, 2024 election; lower-house Severe per the disproportionality penalty schedule)
Total parliamentary penalties: -175%, capped at -100%

Parliamentary score after penalties:
28.75% × 0 = 0%

7. CATEGORY-WIDE PENALTY APPLICATION:
None in this example

FINAL CATEGORY SCORE: 0%
Contribution to DFI: 0% × 25% = 0%
```

##### Classification Uncertainty Note Example

```
⚠️ CLASSIFICATION UNCERTAINTY NOTE ⚠️
-----------------------------------------
The UK Elections category presents a case where the parliamentary components' 
base score (28.75% after redistribution calculations) is reduced to 0% through
the application of penalties. These penalties (-50% for Monarch's power, -25% 
for unelected upper house with significant delay power, -100% for severe 
disproportionality at Gallagher 23.7) total -175%, capped at -100% per 
Section 3.1.8.1.

After strict application of these penalties as required by the DFI methodology, 
the Elections category score must be 0%. This is because:
1. The parliamentary components constitute 100% of the category (after 
   redistribution from non-applicable presidential components)
2. These components are subject to collective parliamentary penalties 
   totaling -100% (cap)
3. Section 3.1.8.4 requires applying these penalties to reduce the score 
   accordingly
4. No exemptions or adjustments are authorized in the methodology

Verification: The 0% score has been verified against Sections 3.1.8 (Applying 
Penalties) and 3.1.9 (Redistribution and Penalty Interaction Guidelines).
-----------------------------------------
```

#### 3.1.9.7 Common Redistribution Scenarios

The following table summarizes common redistribution scenarios with their corresponding multipliers:

| Scenario | Non-Applicable Components | Applicable Weight | Multiplier |
|----------|---------------------------|------------------|------------|
| Parliamentary system | Presidential Election Methods (25%) | 75% | 1.3333 |
| FPTP system in parliamentary country | Presidential (25%) + Threshold (13.33%) | 61.67% | 1.6215 |
| Mixed system with inapplicable threshold | Threshold (10%) | 90% | 1.1111 |
| Constitutional Court absent | Constitutional Court (3% of Safeguards) | 12% | 1.25 |
| No direct presidential elections | Presidential Recall (50% of Recall) | 60% | 1.6667 |

When multiple components are non-applicable, perform redistributions sequentially rather than simultaneously to ensure methodological consistency.

#### 3.1.9.8 Important Principles for Penalty Application

1. **No Exemptions Principle**: Penalties must always be applied as specified in the guidelines without exceptions, adjustments, or mitigations not explicitly authorized in the methodology.

2. **Zero Floor Principle**: When penalties reach or exceed -100%, the affected component or category score becomes 0%, regardless of any other considerations.

3. **Transparency Principle**: All penalty applications must be fully documented with explicit calculations showing how the final score was reached.

4. **Methodological Consistency Principle**: The same penalty application procedures must be used across all countries to maintain comparability.

5. **No Ad Hoc Adjustments**: Creating special cases or adjustments not explicitly provided for in the methodology is prohibited and violates the core principles of the DFI framework.

These principles ensure objective assessment of democratic fitness and prevent subjective interpretations from influencing scores.

### 3.1.10 Distinguishing Veto and Delay Powers of Unelected Institutions

#### 3.1.10.1 Overview

The DFI methodology includes specific penalties for unelected institutions with powers over democratic processes. This section clarifies the distinction between veto powers and delay powers of unelected institutions to ensure consistent application of penalties across different constitutional systems. These distinctions are crucial for accurately assessing democratic fitness in accordance with the DFI definition of democracy as "a model of governance where people are in charge of decision-making."

#### 3.1.10.2 Definition of Veto vs. Delay Powers for Unelected Institutions

For the purposes of applying DFI penalties:

**Veto Power**: An unelected institution possesses a veto power when it can permanently or indefinitely prevent, reject, or block legislation, constitutional amendments, or electoral outcomes without a constitutional mechanism for the elected institution to overcome the obstruction.

**Delay Power**: An unelected institution possesses only a delay power when it can temporarily postpone legislation, constitutional amendments, or electoral outcomes for a defined period, after which the elected institution can proceed without the unelected institution's consent.

#### 3.1.10.3 Criteria for Identifying Delay Powers (Not Subject to Veto Penalties)

An unelected institution's power constitutes a delay (rather than a veto) when ALL of the following criteria are met:

1. **Temporal Limitation**: The delay has a clearly defined maximum duration specified in constitutional or legal provisions.

2. **Procedural Bypass**: After the delay period expires, a constitutional or legal mechanism exists for the elected institution to proceed without further consent from the unelected institution.

3. **Non-Renewable**: The delay cannot be repeatedly imposed on the same legislation or decision to create a de facto veto.

4. **No Substantive Conditions**: The continuation of the process after the delay does not depend on meeting new substantive conditions imposed by the unelected institution.

If ANY of these criteria are not met, the power must be classified as a veto power and the corresponding penalties in the DFI framework must be applied.

#### 3.1.10.4 Applying Penalties for Unelected Institutions

Based on the classification of an unelected institution's powers, the following penalties apply:

##### 3.1.10.4.1 Veto Powers

When an unelected institution possesses veto powers, the following penalties apply:

1. **Veto over any legislation**: When an unelected institution can permanently block any legislation passed by elected representatives, a -100% penalty applies to parliamentary elections. This applies in cases of "perfect bicameralism" where the unelected chamber has equal powers to the elected chamber and no override mechanism exists.

2. **Veto over regional legislation**: When an unelected institution can permanently block legislation related to regional/federal issues but not all legislation, a -40% penalty applies to parliamentary elections. This applies in federal systems where the upper house represents regional interests and has veto power over legislation affecting state/provincial competencies.

3. **Forcing changes**: When an unelected institution can force changes to legislation against the will of elected representatives (elected chamber must accept amendments), a -100% penalty applies to parliamentary elections.

##### 3.1.10.4.2 Special Procedural Powers

When an unelected institution lacks full veto power but has special powers that impede democratic processes:

1. **Extraordinary measures required**: When overcoming an unelected institution's opposition requires extraordinary measures such as supermajorities, qualified majorities, or special procedures, a -25% penalty applies to parliamentary elections.

2. **Extended delays**: When an unelected institution can delay legislation for over 1 year, a -25% penalty applies to parliamentary elections.

##### 3.1.10.4.3 Delay Powers (No Penalties)

When an unelected institution has only delay powers that meet all criteria in Section 3.1.10.3 and the delay period does not exceed 1 year, no penalty applies. This recognizes that temporary delays that can be overcome through normal democratic procedures do not fundamentally undermine citizen control over decision-making.

##### 3.1.10.4.4 Actual Use in Practice

For all penalties related to unelected institutions:

- When a power exists but has not been used in practice during the current constitutional order, half of the impact score applies
- When a power has been used in practice during the current constitutional order, the full impact score applies

#### 3.1.10.5 Amendment and Suspensive Powers: Additional Considerations

##### 3.1.10.5.1 Amendment Powers

The ability of an unelected institution to propose amendments should be assessed based on what happens when the elected chamber rejects those amendments:

1. **Amendments can be rejected by simple majority**: If the elected chamber can reject amendments from the unelected institution through a simple majority vote, this does not constitute a veto power and no penalty applies.

2. **Amendments can only be rejected by supermajority**: If extraordinary measures are required to reject amendments, the -25% penalty for "extraordinary measures required" applies.

3. **Amendments cannot be rejected**: If the elected chamber must accept amendments from the unelected institution, the -100% penalty for "forcing changes" applies.

##### 3.1.10.5.2 Suspensive Veto

A suspensive veto (which can be overridden) should be classified as:

1. **Delay power**: If it can be overridden by simple majority after a defined period and meets all delay criteria in Section 3.1.10.3.

2. **Special procedural power**: If overcoming the suspensive veto requires extraordinary measures such as supermajorities or special procedures.

#### 3.1.10.6 Documentation Requirements

When documenting the classification of an unelected institution's powers, include:

```
VETO VS. DELAY CLASSIFICATION:
Institution: [Name of unelected institution]
Selection method: [How members are selected/appointed]
Constitutional/Legal Basis: [Citation to provisions establishing the power]
Power Type: [Veto/Delay/Special Procedural]
Justification:
- Temporal Limitation: [Specify constitutional/legal provision and maximum duration]
- Procedural Bypass: [Describe mechanism for proceeding without consent]
- Non-Renewable: [Confirm inability to repeatedly delay the same decision]
- No Substantive Conditions: [Verify no additional requirements imposed]
- Amendment Power: [Describe what happens when amendments are rejected]
Applicable Penalty: [Specify which penalty applies or confirm no penalty applies]
Actual Use in Practice: [Document instances of use during current constitutional order]
Applied Penalty: [Full or half based on actual use]
```

### 3.1.11 Constitutional History and Penalty Application

When evaluating penalties that include historical assessments (e.g., "Actual use in practice over the last 100 years"), it is crucial to consider constitutional continuity and democratic transitions. This ensures countries are evaluated based on their current constitutional order rather than penalized for pre-democratic historical periods.

#### 3.1.11.1 Constitutional Transition Rule

**The historical evaluation period for penalties begins with the current constitutional order, not an arbitrary 100-year window.** Specifically:

1. **Complete Constitutional Replacement**: When a country has adopted an entirely new constitution as part of a democratic transition or regime change, the historical evaluation period begins with the enactment of that constitution.

2. **Major Constitutional Reforms**: When fundamental democratic reforms have substantially altered the structure of government powers, the historical evaluation begins from the implementation of those reforms.

3. **Continuity and Amendments**: Minor constitutional amendments or regular legislative changes do not reset the historical evaluation period.

#### 3.1.11.2 Examples for Clarification

- **Spain**: Historical evaluation begins with the 1978 Constitution establishing the current democratic system, not including the Franco era.

- **Post-Soviet States**: Historical evaluation begins with their independence constitutions, not including the Soviet period.

- **South Africa**: Historical evaluation begins with the 1996 Constitution, not including the apartheid era.

#### 3.1.11.3 Documentation Requirements

When applying this rule, assessors must:

1. **Identify the relevant constitutional starting point** and provide citation to the official adoption date

2. **Justify the selected starting point** with reference to constitutional history scholarship

3. **Document any relevant uses of powers** within the defined constitutional period

4. **Note any significant pre-constitutional history** for context, while clearly indicating it does not factor into penalty calculations

#### 3.1.11.4 Application to Specific Penalties

When a penalty specification mentions "Actual use in practice (over the last 100 years)," it should be interpreted as:

> "Actual use in practice during the current constitutional order (or past 100 years, whichever is shorter)"

### 3.1.12 Clarification on Federal Upper Houses and Non-Directly Elected Bodies

#### 3.1.12.1 Upper Houses in Federal Systems

When evaluating the penalty for "Upper house with an influence over legislation and majority or all members not elected directly by the people" (-50% for parliamentary elections), it is important to apply this consistently regardless of federal structure justifications.

Federal systems often include upper houses designed to represent state/provincial interests at the national level. While this serves legitimate federalist purposes, from the perspective of citizen power and direct democratic influence (the core focus of the DFI), non-directly elected bodies with legislative veto powers still constitute a limitation on direct citizen influence over legislation.

#### 3.1.12.2 Application Guidelines

1. **Apply the penalty based on selection method and powers, not purpose**: The -50% penalty applies whenever an upper house has significant legislative influence and its members are not directly elected by citizens, regardless of the federal rationale for its structure.

2. **Full vs. reduced penalty**: The full -50% penalty applies when the upper house actively exercises its legislative powers. The reduced -25% penalty applies only when such powers exist but have not been used in practice over the relevant historical period.

3. **No exception for federal councils**: Federal councils or upper chambers composed of delegates appointed by state/provincial governments (rather than directly elected by citizens) still trigger this penalty if they have substantive legislative influence.

#### 3.1.12.3 Example: Germany's Bundesrat

Germany's Bundesrat (Federal Council) provides a clear example:

- **Structure**: Members are delegates appointed by state governments (Länder), not directly elected by citizens
- **Powers**: Absolute veto over federal legislation affecting state competencies and finances (roughly 40% of all legislation); suspensive veto over other legislation; required approval for constitutional amendments
- **Usage**: These powers are actively used in Germany's legislative process
- **Correct penalty application**: The full -40% penalty applies to parliamentary election components, not the reduced -20% rate

#### 3.1.12.4 Alternative Federal Models

When considering this penalty, note that federal representation can be achieved while maintaining direct citizen election:

- The U.S. Senate represents state interests but senators are directly elected by citizens
- Australia's Senate provides state representation through direct elections
- The Canadian Senate, while appointed, has limited practical powers to permanently block legislation

#### 3.1.12.5 Documentation Requirements

When applying this penalty to federal upper houses, clearly document:

1. The selection method for members (specifying how they are not directly elected by citizens)
2. The specific legislative powers the body possesses
3. Evidence of these powers being used in practice (if applying the full penalty)
4. A clear explanation of why the federal structure, despite its purposes, creates a democratic limitation from the perspective of direct citizen influence

The DFI does not evaluate whether federalism itself is desirable or undesirable, but rather measures the extent to which citizens can directly influence decision-making. Non-directly elected bodies with substantive legislative powers create a structural limitation on this influence, regardless of their other merits.

### 3.1.13 Strict Adherence to Established Scoring Criteria

To ensure methodological consistency and comparability across country assessments, the following principles must be strictly observed:

#### 3.1.13.1 No Modified or Intermediate Scores

- **Use only exact point values explicitly stated in the DFI guidelines**. Do not create intermediate scores, partial points, or proportional allocations unless they are specifically authorized in the methodology.
  
- **Example**: If a component offers only options of 5 points, 0 points, or a penalty, these are the only valid scoring options. A score of 2.5/5 or any other intermediate value would be methodologically invalid.

- **Rationale**: Introducing unstated values compromises comparability between assessments and undermines the validity of the DFI framework.

#### 3.1.13.2 No Additional Categories or Indicators

- **Use only the categories, components, and indicators explicitly defined in the DFI methodology**. Do not create new indicators or subcategories.

- **Do not modify the weighting structure** or redistribute points between components except where explicitly directed by the guidelines (e.g., for non-applicable presidential elections).

- **Example**: If a country has a unique democratic feature that doesn't align with existing indicators, document it in the notes section rather than creating a new scoring component.

#### 3.1.13.3 Documentation of Scoring Decisions

When evaluating components where multiple options exist:

- **Explicitly cite the exact criteria applied** from the DFI guidelines
- **Quote the relevant scoring option verbatim**
- **Document the specific evidence** that justifies the selection of this scoring option

This creates a clear audit trail connecting each score to its methodological foundation.

#### 3.1.13.4 Quality Control Checkpoint

Before finalizing any component score, verify:

- [ ] Is this score one of the exact values listed in the DFI guidelines?
- [ ] Have I used the precise category and component structure defined in the methodology?
- [ ] Is my justification directly linked to a specific scoring criterion?

## Appendix: Calculation Examples (Note: these examples use older version of points in the Campaign Finance Controls that is no longer applicable. The examples below are meant just to show the process of scoring)

### Elections Category with Updated Points and Penalties

This example illustrates how to calculate a comprehensive Elections category score using the updated point values and penalty system:

#### Initial Component Scoring
```
1. Campaign Account Structure: All spending through official account = 5/5 points (100%)
2. Donation Restrictions:
   - Foreign Source: Both official and other channels completely prohibited = 8/8 points (100%)
   - Corporate Donations: Prohibited in official accounts, limited in other channels, allowed for non-election activities = 4/8 points (50%)
   - Individual Donation Limits: 3-5 monthly salaries for both presidential and party donations = 4/8 points (50%)
3. Campaign Spending Controls:
   - Presidential: Strict limits = 10/10 points (100%)
   - Parliamentary - Individual: Soft caps = 5/10 points (50%)
   - Parliamentary - Party: Strict limits = 10/10 points (100%)
4. Public Funding Systems: Flat Rate 25-50% = 20/30 points (66.67%)
5. Transparency Requirements: Full disclosure = 10/10 points (100%)

Component subtotals:
- Campaign Finance Controls: 66/99 points = 66.67%
- Electoral District Design: 30/40 points = 75%
- Parliamentary Vote Counting: 15/20 points = 75%
- Electoral Threshold: 10/20 points = 50%
- Presidential Methods: 15/20 points = 75%
```

#### Penalty Identification
```
Foreign Source Donations Loopholes: 
- Review found technical workarounds through subsidiaries of foreign corporations
- Penalty: -25% for elections category (capped at -25% for foreign donation issues)
```

#### Final Calculation
```
Base category score before penalties: 68.5%
Penalty application: -25% (foreign donation loopholes)
Final Elections category score: 68.5% - 25% = 43.5%
Contribution to DFI: 43.5% × 25% = 10.875%
```

This example shows how to properly apply the updated penalty structure for foreign donation loopholes while respecting the maximum penalty cap for this component.

***

### Presidential System with Foreign Donation Loopholes

```
Campaign Finance Controls components:
- Campaign Account Structure: Mixed system = 0/5 points (0%)
- Foreign Source Donations: Prohibited but with loopholes = 0/8 points (0%)
- Corporate Donations: Partially prohibited = 4/8 points (50%)
- Individual Donation Limits: No limits for presidential, low caps for parties = 2/8 points (25%)
- Campaign Spending Controls: No limits = 0/30 points (0%)
- Public Funding: Limited reimbursement = 10/30 points (33.33%)
- Transparency: Limited disclosure = 0/10 points (0%)

Total Campaign Finance: 16/99 points = 16.16%

Applicable Penalties:
- Foreign donation loopholes: -25% for elections category
- No limits on individual presidential donations: -25% for elections category
- No campaign spending limits: -25% for elections category

Total penalties: -75% for elections category

Base score: 45% (all components)
Final Elections score: 45% - 75% = 0% (minimum score rule applies)
Contribution to DFI: 0%
```

### Presidential Power to Dissolve Parliament Assessment

When evaluating potential penalties for presidential power to dissolve parliament:

1. **No Penalty Applies** when:
   - The constitution provides for parliament dissolution only in specific deadlock situations (e.g., repeated failure to form government, budget non-approval)
   - The mechanism requires parliamentary involvement (e.g., parliament votes for its own dissolution)
   - The power can only be exercised after judicial or constitutional court review
   - The power is subject to substantial limitations and checks

2. **Partial Penalty (-50%)** applies when:
   - The president has conditional dissolution power beyond deadlock resolution
   - The power exists but has never been used outside proper constitutional frameworks
   - Substantive procedural hurdles exist before the power can be exercised

3. **Full Penalty (-100%)** applies when:
   - The president can unilaterally dissolve parliament without significant constitutional limitations
   - The power has been used to undermine parliamentary independence within the last 100 years
   - The power has been exercised outside the specific conditions provided by the constitution

**Documentation Requirements:**
- Exact constitutional provisions with article numbers
- Historical instances of use with dates and circumstances
- Expert analysis of how the power functions in practice
- Judicial decisions interpreting the scope of the power


### Bicameral Legislature Scoring

When evaluating parliamentary vote counting methods in bicameral systems:

1. Score based primarily on the lower house (typically larger, more powerful chamber)
2. Document the upper house system for context only
3. Do not average or split scores between chambers unless specified otherwise
4. If the upper house has exceptional powers (e.g., equal to lower house), note this as a special case

## Special Cases and Edge Conditions

### Non-existent Mechanisms

When a particular democratic mechanism doesn't exist in a country:
- Assign 0% for the relevant component or subcategory
- Document the absence explicitly
- No redistribution of weight occurs (unlike presidential systems)

### Mixed Systems

For countries with mixed electoral or governance systems:
- Evaluate each component separately
- For electoral thresholds in mixed systems, prorate based on PR proportion
- For mixed-member proportional (MMP) and parallel mixed systems, compute Electoral disproportionality on the chamber's final aggregate seat allocation per the Gallagher Index methodology (see §1.3 below). Compensatory MMP typically produces low Gallagher values, but threshold effects (e.g., parties just below the legal threshold) can still drive a Limited classification — Germany 2025 (Gallagher 6.7, Minimal but boundary-case) is a worked example.
- The Intentional gerrymandering assessment (see §1.4) applies separately and only to the SMD-tier district boundaries when those are drawn rather than constitutionally fixed.

### Federal Systems

For federal countries:
- Focus on national-level mechanisms
- Note any cases where mechanisms exist only at subnational levels
- Document any federal constraints on democratic mechanisms

APPENDIX I

## 1.3 Electoral Disproportionality Assessment

### 1.3.1 Overview

Electoral disproportionality measures the mathematical gap between votes cast and seats won. It is a property of the electoral system itself — a First-Past-The-Post system can produce substantial disproportionality even with fairly-drawn district boundaries; a proportional-representation system with high district magnitude produces minimal disproportionality regardless of boundary shape.

This assessment is mathematical, not investigative. It does **not** measure intentional partisan or racial-discriminatory manipulation of district boundaries. That separate question is handled by §1.4 Intentional Gerrymandering Assessment, which applies its own per-chamber penalty schedule.

### 1.3.2 Applicability

This assessment applies to every directly-elected chamber that translates citizen votes into seats — including pure FPTP systems, parallel mixed systems, and compensatory MMP systems. Even purely proportional systems should be assessed: their Gallagher Index is mechanically near zero, which is the correct answer at Minimal.

This assessment does NOT apply to:
- Indirectly elected, appointed, or hereditary chambers (UK House of Lords, Canadian Senate, German Bundesrat, Netherlands Eerste Kamer)
- Fixed territorial-unit chambers where seat allocation is constitutional rather than electoral (US Senate, Swiss Council of States)

For non-applicable chambers, mark Not Applicable. The chamber's accountability deficit is captured by the unelected-upper-house distortion rows in §3.1.7.

### 1.3.3 Assessment Metric — Gallagher Index

Disproportionality is measured by the **Gallagher Index** (Least Squares Index, LSq), the standard metric in comparative electoral systems research.

**Calculation:**

For each chamber separately:

1. For each party (including independents and named minor parties), compute:
   - Vote share % = (party votes ÷ total valid votes) × 100
   - Seat share % = (party seats ÷ total seats in chamber) × 100
   - Squared difference = (vote share − seat share)²
2. Sum the squared differences across all parties.
3. Divide by 2.
4. Take the square root.

```
Gallagher Index (LSq) = √( Σ (Vᵢ − Sᵢ)² ÷ 2 )
```

where Vᵢ is party i's vote share percentage and Sᵢ is party i's seat share percentage.

**Sub-1% party aggregation:** Parties below 1% of the national vote may be aggregated into a single "Other" bucket only when the combined "Other" share is itself ≤ 2%. When the sub-1% tail collectively exceeds 2% — typical in fragmented multi-party systems where 20+ small parties compete — list each party individually instead. Aggregating a large tail mathematically treats independently-competing parties as if they were one party, dramatically inflating the squared-difference contribution and distorting the metric.

**Mixed electoral systems (parallel or compensatory MMP):** Compute Gallagher on the chamber's final seat allocation in aggregate, treating the chamber as a single voting-to-seats translation. The voter cast votes; the chamber has its composition; Gallagher measures the gap. Do not separate SMD and PR portions for the calculation. Use the PR-block (party-list) vote share as the denominator since this is the cleanest expression of party preference.

**Satellite-party situations:** Where major parties field PR-only "satellite" lists separate from the parent party (e.g., South Korea 2020 onwards), the PR ballot does not cleanly express party preference — parent-party voters cast tactical PR ballots for the satellite, and the satellite's vote share appears against the parent's full seat allocation. In these cases, the standard PR-vote-share denominator inflates Gallagher dramatically without identifying any voter-to-seat translation harm. For satellite-party cases, compute Gallagher using the constituency (SMD) vote share against final seat allocation, treating each parent-and-satellite as a single party. Document the methodology choice in the per-country file.

### 1.3.4 Classification Thresholds

The Gallagher Index value, computed per chamber, maps to a DFI bracket:

| Gallagher Index | Classification |
|---:|---|
| < 7 | Minimal |
| 7 to 15 (inclusive both edges) | Limited |
| > 15 | Severe |

So Gallagher 7.00 is Limited (not Minimal); Gallagher 15.00 is Limited (not Severe); Gallagher 15.01 is Severe.

### 1.3.5 Per-Chamber Penalty Schedule

| Chamber affected | Limited | Severe |
|---|---:|---:|
| Lower house only | -50% | -100% |
| Upper house only | -25% | -50% |
| Both houses | -50% | -100% |
| Single chamber (unicameral) | -50% | -100% |

The lower-house / upper-house asymmetry preserves the DFI convention that upper-chamber distortions count for half — upper houses often serve territorial-balance functions and are not direct mass-democratic representations.

**"Both houses" is not additive.** The "Both houses" row equals the lower-house-only row at the same severity level. The framework's logic is that the lower house dominates the parliamentary-scope effect; upper-house issues do not compound on top when the lower house is already affected.

**Mixed-severity (asymmetric) chamber pairs:** When the two chambers fall in different non-Minimal brackets (e.g., lower Limited + upper Severe), apply the **max-per-chamber-penalty-value convention** — take the larger of the two chamber-specific penalty values, not the higher classification:

| Lower | Upper | Penalty | Reasoning |
|---|---|---:|---|
| Minimal | Limited | -25% | max(0, -25) = -25 |
| Minimal | Severe | -50% | max(0, -50) = -50 |
| Limited | Minimal | -50% | max(-50, 0) = -50 |
| Limited | Limited | -50% | "Both houses — Limited" |
| Limited | Severe | -50% | max(-50, -50) = -50 — *not* Severe; Upper Severe is only -50% to begin with |
| Severe | Minimal | -100% | max(-100, 0) = -100 |
| Severe | Limited | -100% | max(-100, -25) = -100 |
| Severe | Severe | -100% | "Both houses — Severe" |

Document the per-chamber Gallagher values in the country YAML comment so the asymmetry remains visible to readers. The framework option chosen is the symmetric case whose penalty value matches the max-per-chamber result.

#### Design rationale and known limitations

The max-per-chamber convention reflects two design constraints:

1. **The framework's existing brackets are preserved.** The v3.0 spec offers four bracket cells (lower-only / upper-only / both-houses-same-bracket / unicameral). The asymmetric convention represents Lower X + Upper Y configurations using one of the four existing cells; it does not introduce new cells or new penalty values.

2. **The "lower-house dominates" principle is preserved.** The Both Limited and Both Severe rows equal the lower-only-at-the-same-severity row (not additive). The convention extends this principle to asymmetric cases by taking the per-chamber maximum rather than summing.

The alternative — a sum-with-cap convention (Lower-pen + Upper-pen, capped at -100%) — would change current corpus classifications: Japan's "Both Limited = -50%" (lower 14.9 / upper 13.0) would shift to -75% (-50% + -25%), reopening the v3.0 spec's "Both Limited not additive" call. The max-per-chamber convention preserves Japan and all other current classifications.

**Under-determined corner case**: Lower **Limited** + Upper **Severe** = -50% under the max-per-chamber rule, because Upper Severe maps to -50% (upper-house penalties halved) and max(-50, -50) = -50%. This produces the same penalty as Lower Limited alone; the upper-house Severe disproportionality is empirically real but produces no marginal effect on the score. No corpus country currently triggers this configuration; if a future country does, this design choice may be revisited (logged in `notes/spec-issues.md`).

**Worked example — Spain 2023 (Lower Minimal + Upper Severe)**: Congreso 6.0 Minimal, Senado (directly elected, 208 seats) 21.5 Severe. max(0, -50) = -50%. Mapped to "Upper house only — Severe (>15%)" framework option. The asymmetric per-chamber values are documented in the country YAML comment.

### 1.3.6 Worked Example — UK House of Commons 2024

```
Party        Vote %    Seat %    (V−S)²
Labour        33.7      63.2      870.25
Conservative  23.7      18.6       26.01
Reform UK     14.3       0.8      182.25
Liberal Dem   12.2      11.1        1.21
Green          6.7       0.6       37.21
SNP            2.5       1.4        1.21
Other          6.9       4.3        6.76

Sum of squared differences = 1124.90
Divided by 2 = 562.45
Square root = 23.7

Gallagher Index = 23.7 → Severe (>15%)
House of Commons (lower house) Severe → -100% to parliamentary scope.
```

### 1.3.7 Reference Values from the Existing Corpus

| Country | Chamber | Gallagher (most recent election) | Bracket |
|---|---|---:|---|
| UK | House of Commons (2024) | 23.7 | Severe |
| Botswana | National Assembly (2024) | 23.0 | Severe |
| Japan | House of Representatives (2024) | 14.9 | Limited |
| Japan | House of Councillors (2022, half-renewal) | 13.0 | Limited |
| Poland | Senate (2023) | 11.6 | Limited |
| Mexico | Chamber of Deputies (2024) | 9.2 | Limited |
| South Korea | National Assembly (2024, constituency-vote framing) | 8.5 | Limited |
| Costa Rica | Legislative Assembly (2022) | 8.3 | Limited |
| Latvia | Saeima (2022) | 10.5 | Limited |
| Peru | Congress (2021) | 14.0 | Limited |
| Mexico | Senate (2024) | 6.7 | Minimal |
| Germany | Bundestag (2025) | 6.7 | Minimal |
| Poland | Sejm (2023) | 6.5 | Minimal |
| Canada | House of Commons (2025) | 5.1 | Minimal |
| Switzerland | National Council (2023) | 4.1 | Minimal |
| Colombia | House (2022) / Senate (2022) | 4.1 / 4.2 | Minimal / Minimal |
| Norway | Storting (2021) | 4.0 | Minimal |
| USA | House of Representatives (2024) | 1.9 | Minimal |
| Netherlands | Tweede Kamer (2023) | 1.3 | Minimal |
| Sweden | Riksdag (2022) | 1.0 | Minimal |
| South Africa | National Assembly (2024) | 2.3 | Minimal |

These values are computed per the methodology above and locked into the per-country research files under `Countries - results/<Country>/Special research/<Country> - Electoral disproportionality - special research.md`.

---

## 1.4 Intentional Gerrymandering Assessment

### 1.4.1 Overview

Intentional gerrymandering — the deliberate manipulation of electoral district boundaries for partisan or racial-discriminatory advantage — is a separate question from mathematical disproportionality. A country can show high disproportionality without intentional manipulation (UK 2024 — Severe Gallagher, independent boundary commissions), low disproportionality with intentional manipulation in a sub-region (USA — Minimal aggregate Gallagher, well-documented state-level intentional gerrymandering for the federal House map), or both simultaneously.

The two-row split (§1.3 + §1.4) lets the DFI report each dimension independently rather than conflating them into a single number.

### 1.4.2 Applicability

This assessment applies per chamber to bodies whose electoral districts are *drawn*, i.e., where lines are subject to a redistricting process and could in principle be moved for partisan advantage.

The assessment is **Not Applicable** when the chamber has no manipulable boundaries:
- Constitutional administrative regions used as multi-member districts (e.g., Peru's 27 departments, Colombia's 32 departmental constituencies)
- Fixed territorial units with constitutional allocation (US Senate, Swiss Council of States)
- Nationwide single-constituency PR (Netherlands Tweede Kamer, Israel)
- Indirectly elected, appointed, or hereditary chambers

### 1.4.3 Evidence Standard

Classification as "Present" requires **Strong evidence** of intent in the currently-in-force boundaries. Any one of the following types alone suffices:

- **Type A — Court rulings.** A domestic or international court has ruled that the currently-in-force boundaries were drawn with partisan or racially-discriminatory intent. Examples: NC Supreme Court 2022 ruling on the 2020 NC map (since reversed); LULAC v. Texas 2025 federal panel ruling on the Texas mid-decade map; Wisconsin Supreme Court 2023 striking the prior partisan-gerrymander maps.
- **Type B — Legislative-record evidence.** Transcripts, official documents, or formal legislative debate show partisan-advantage as the explicit goal of boundary drawing. Examples: Hungary 2011 Fidesz redistricting parliamentary debate.
- **Type C — Public partisan-advantage statements.** Lawmakers, governors, or officials with authority over the boundary process have publicly stated that partisan advantage was the motive. Examples: Abbott + Trump explicit "5 GOP seats" statements regarding Texas 2025; Newsom's "fight fire with fire" statement on California Prop 50.

**Type D — Quantitative pattern alone (insufficient on its own).** A high efficiency gap, extreme seats-votes asymmetry, or extreme Gallagher Index *suggests* possible manipulation but does not establish intent. Type D evidence requires corroboration by at least one of A, B, or C. Without corroboration, classify as Not Present even if disproportionality is Severe.

### 1.4.4 Classification Options Per Chamber

- **Not applicable** — chamber has no manipulable boundaries (see §1.4.2)
- **Not present** — chamber has manipulable boundaries but no Strong-evidence intent in the currently-in-force map
- **Present** — Strong-evidence intent (A, B, or C) documented in the currently-in-force map

### 1.4.5 Per-Chamber Penalty Schedule

| Chamber affected | Present penalty |
|---|---:|
| Lower house only | -100% |
| Upper house only | -50% |
| Both houses | -100% |
| Single chamber (unicameral) | -100% |

**Asymmetric chamber pairs:** Apply the same max-per-chamber-penalty-value convention as §1.3.5. Lower Present + Upper Not Present resolves to -100% (lower-house-only). Lower Not Present + Upper Present resolves to -50% (upper-house-only). Both Present resolves to -100%.

### 1.4.6 Present-State Rule

Only the boundaries currently in force matter. Past manipulations of maps that have since been redrawn do not contribute to the assessment.

**Edge cases:**
- **Court-struck-down map under stay (still in force).** When a court has found intent but the ruling is stayed pending appeal and the map remains in use for upcoming elections, classify as Present (the map is currently in force, and Type A evidence exists). Example: Texas 2025 — federal panel found intent, SCOTUS stayed pending appeal, map used for 2026.
- **Court-ordered remedial map.** When a partisan map has been struck down and replaced with a court-supervised remedial map, classify as Not Present at the chamber level. The current map was court-drawn, not partisan-drawn. Example: Wisconsin 2024 — court-drawn remedial map after 2023 ruling.
- **Stacked nominally-independent commission.** When an "independent" commission is formally insulated but its appointment process has been politically captured (e.g., all members appointed by one party with documented partisan intent), Type A or B evidence in the appointment process can suffice. Without such evidence, classify as Not Present.
- **Mid-decade redistricting that preserves the prior partisan composition.** Treat the new map by the same standard as a fresh map — what evidence exists for the *currently-in-force* boundaries? If the new map has Type A/B/C evidence, classify as Present.

### 1.4.7 Federal-Aggregate Treatment

For federal countries where each state/Land/province draws its own portion of the federal lower-house map (e.g., USA, Australia, Canada at one remove), the federal aggregate inherits the highest-evidence classification across constituent jurisdictions. If even one state's currently-in-force districts have Strong-evidence intent for the federal House, the federal lower-house assessment is Present.

This is consistent with the principle that any structurally significant manipulation in any meaningful portion of the federal map subverts the will of voters at the federal level.

### 1.4.8 Disproportionality + Intent Independence

The two penalties (Electoral disproportionality §1.3 + Intentional gerrymandering §1.4) apply independently. A country may incur penalties under both, both subject to the same -100% parliamentary-scope cap when summed with other parliamentary-scope penalties (§3.1.8.1).

**Worked example — USA House 2024:**
- §1.3 Electoral disproportionality: Gallagher 1.9 → Minimal → no penalty
- §1.4 Intentional gerrymandering: Lower house — Present (Texas LULAC ruling + California Prop 50 + North Carolina) → -100% to lower-house parliamentary scope

The USA case illustrates exactly why the two-row split is needed: the aggregate vote/seat translation is near-perfectly proportional (two-party near-balance), but the boundaries that produce that proportionality were drawn with documented partisan intent in multiple states.

**Worked example — UK House of Commons 2024:**
- §1.3 Electoral disproportionality: Gallagher 23.7 → Severe → -100% to lower-house parliamentary scope
- §1.4 Intentional gerrymandering: Lower house — Not present (independent Boundary Commissions, Labour landslide on those boundaries empirically rebuts partisan-advantage hypothesis)

The UK case is the mirror image: the system is mathematically distorted by FPTP itself, not by intentional manipulation.

### 1.4.9 Reference Values from the Existing Corpus

| Country | Lower house | Upper house |
|---|---|---|
| USA (2024) | Lower — Present | Not applicable (fixed territorial units) |
| UK (2024) | Not present | Not applicable (appointed/hereditary Lords) |
| Botswana (2024) | Single chamber — Not present | — |
| Japan (2024) | Not present | Not applicable (fixed prefectures + nationwide PR) |
| Mexico (2024) | Not present | Not applicable (constitutional state boundaries) |
| Canada (2025) | Not present | Not applicable (PM-appointed Senate) |
| Germany (2025) | Not present | Not applicable (indirectly elected Bundesrat) |
| Poland (2023) | Not present | Not present |
| South Korea (2024) | Single chamber — Not present | — |
| Switzerland (2023) | Not applicable (cantonal PR) | Not applicable (fixed cantonal allocation) |
| Norway / Sweden / Netherlands / Latvia / Costa Rica / Peru / Colombia / South Africa | Not applicable (PR with constitutional/fixed boundaries) | — / Not applicable |

These classifications are locked into the per-country research files under `Countries - results/<Country>/Special research/<Country> - Intentional gerrymandering - special research.md`.