


### 3.3 Parliamentary Legislative Initiative (5%)

#### 3.3.1 Distinguishing Between Types of Citizen-Initiated Mechanisms

The DFI framework evaluates several distinct types of citizen-initiated democratic mechanisms, each in its own category. To prevent confusion and ensure consistent assessment, this section clarifies the critical differences between these mechanisms.

##### 3.3.1.1 Parliamentary Legislative Initiative (Category 3)

**Definition**: Parliamentary Legislative Initiative refers specifically to mechanisms allowing citizens to propose **ordinary legislation** to parliament. This is distinct from constitutional amendments or direct referenda.

**Key characteristics**:
- Proposals are for regular statutory laws, not constitutional amendments
- Parliament deliberates on the citizen-proposed legislation
- The outcome is parliamentary consideration of the proposal, which may lead to adoption, modification, or rejection by parliament
- The process does not automatically trigger a referendum

**Example**: The "Popular Legislative Initiative" in Spain, where 500,000 signatures can submit a legislative proposal to Congress.

##### 3.3.1.2 Other Citizen-Initiated Mechanisms (Not to be Confused)

**1. Constitutional Amendment Initiatives** (Assessed in Category 7: Ability to Change the Constitution)
- Purpose: To amend the constitution, not ordinary legislation
- Example: Switzerland's Popular Initiative for constitutional amendments (100,000 signatures)

**2. Abrogative Referenda** (Assessed in Category 2: Holding Politicians Accountable)
- Purpose: To repeal or reject existing laws
- Example: Italy's abrogative referendum mechanism (500,000 signatures)

**3. Policy Issue Referenda** (Assessed in Category 4: Referenda)
- Purpose: To pass new laws directly through citizen vote, bypassing parliament
- Example: Switzerland's optional referendum mechanism (50,000 signatures)

##### 3.3.1.3 Assessment Example: Switzerland

**Incorrect assessment**:
- Using Switzerland's constitutional amendment initiative (Federal Constitution, Article 139) to score Parliamentary Legislative Initiative
- This mechanism allows 100,000 citizens to propose constitutional amendments, not ordinary legislation

**Correct assessment**:
- Switzerland does not have a formal mechanism for citizens to propose ordinary legislation directly to parliament for parliamentary consideration
- While Switzerland has strong direct democracy mechanisms, these fall under Categories 2, 4, and 7
- Parliamentary Legislative Initiative score would be 0% due to absence of this specific mechanism

##### 3.3.1.4 Decision Flow Chart

When evaluating a mechanism, ask the following questions to determine the correct category:

1. What is being proposed?
   - Constitutional amendment → Category 7
   - Ordinary legislation → Continue to question 2

2. Who makes the final decision?
   - Citizens through direct vote → Category 4 (Referenda)
   - Parliament → Category 3 (Parliamentary Legislative Initiative)

3. What is the purpose of the mechanism?
   - To repeal existing laws → Category 2 (Holding Politicians Accountable - Abrogative)
   - To introduce new legislation → Category 3 or 4 (depending on question 2)

#### 3.3.2 Subject-Matter Restrictions (Sub-component E, Distortions)

Framework v2.1 introduces a category-wide distortion that captures whether the country's ILP statute restricts the **range of legislative domains** citizens may propose. The distortion applies multiplicatively to the four-subcomponent base score, reflecting that a procedurally well-designed ILP is materially weakened when its scope is narrow.

##### 3.3.2.1 The three classifications

- **None (0% penalty)**: The ILP statute imposes no domain-based restrictions on ordinary-legislation proposals. Citizens may propose laws on any subject within the legislature's competence.
- **Limited restrictions (-25% penalty)**: The ILP statute restricts a narrow set of domains, all of them **financial or budgetary in nature** (budget bills, provisional budgets, public debt, financial guarantees, fiscal-stability measures, tax matters when bundled with budget rules, loan approvals, executive financial contracts).
- **Wide restrictions (-50% penalty)**: The ILP statute restricts domains **beyond financial/budgetary matters** — fundamental rights legislation, electoral law, organic-law domains, international treaties, planning regimes, royal pardon, or any combination that exceeds the financial-only scope.

##### 3.3.2.2 What counts as a restriction (and what doesn't)

**Constitutional matters are NOT counted as a restriction.** Most countries reserve constitutional amendment to a separate Cat 7 pathway. An ILP that is silent on constitutional reform, or explicitly excludes it, is following the default architectural pattern — this is not a Cat 3 restriction. The penalty assesses restrictions on *ordinary legislative domains*.

The classification is binary at each level — if the country's ILP statute imposes any non-financial domain restriction, the classification is **Wide**, regardless of how many restrictions it imposes. The penalty does not scale with the number of excluded domains; it scales with whether the restrictions reach beyond fiscal matters.

##### 3.3.2.3 Worked examples

**Mexico (None — 0% penalty)**

- Constitutional basis: Article 71 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (citizen-initiative pathway, 0.13% of registered voters)
- Statutory implementation: Sistema de Consulta de la Reforma Electoral guidance: "The citizen initiative may address any matter and comprise one or more ordinances when there is connectivity in the themes."
- Classification: **None**. No domain-based restrictions; ILP applies to all ordinary legislation.

**Poland (Limited restrictions — -25% penalty)**

- Constitutional basis: Article 118(2) of the 1997 Polish Constitution (100,000 citizens may introduce legislation)
- Statutory implementation: Article 3 of the *Ustawa z dnia 24 czerwca 1999 r. o wykonywaniu inicjatywy ustawodawczej przez obywateli* (Journal of Laws 1999, No. 62, item 688) excludes from citizen initiative: budget bills, provisional budgets, public debt legislation, and state financial guarantees.
- Classification: **Limited restrictions**. The four exclusions are all financial/budgetary in nature; the ILP remains open to non-financial domains including controversial social issues, defense matters, and tax reforms beyond the budget exclusion.

**Costa Rica (Limited restrictions — -25% penalty)**

- Constitutional basis: Article 123 of the Constitution mandates parliament to vote on citizen initiatives within statutory deadlines.
- Statutory implementation: Article 123 + Law 8.491 exclude budgetary matters, tax/fiscal issues, loan approvals, contracts, and administrative acts.
- Classification: **Limited restrictions**. All exclusions are financial-administrative; broader policy domains remain open.

**Spain (Wide restrictions — -50% penalty)**

- Constitutional basis: Article 87(3) of the 1978 Constitution.
- Statutory implementation: Ley Orgánica 3/1984 Article 2 (as amended by LO 4/2006) excludes:
    1. *Materias propias de ley orgánica* — organic-law matters under CE Article 81: development of fundamental rights and public freedoms, the regimes of the Autonomous Communities, the general electoral regime
    2. *Materias tributarias* — tax matters
    3. *Materias de carácter internacional* — international treaties and foreign-policy framework laws
    4. *Prerrogativa de gracia* — the royal pardon power
    5. *Planificación económica general* — general economic planning (Article 131 CE)
    6. Budget laws (Article 134.1 CE)
- Classification: **Wide restrictions**. The exclusions reach far beyond financial matters into fundamental rights, electoral law, organic-law domains, and international affairs. The material scope of legitimate ILP use is significantly narrowed.

##### 3.3.2.4 Research procedure for the agent

When researching Cat 3 for a country with an active ILP mechanism, the agent must:

1. Locate the constitutional and statutory basis of the ILP (typically a specific article in the constitution + an implementing organic law or statute).
2. Identify any **subject-matter exclusion clause** in the implementing statute. Read the exact text and translate the list of excluded matters.
3. Determine whether the exclusions are limited to financial/budgetary domains, or whether they reach beyond — into fundamental rights, electoral law, treaties, royal pardon, planning, or other non-financial areas.
4. **Constitutional-amendment exclusions do not count.** If the ILP statute explicitly excludes "constitutional reform," ignore that exclusion for Cat 3 purposes; constitutional reform is Cat 7's territory.
5. Apply the binary rule: if any non-financial domain is excluded, classify as **Wide**. If only financial/budgetary domains are excluded, classify as **Limited**. If nothing is excluded (or only constitutional matters), classify as **None**.
6. Document the exact list of excluded matters in the research file under a §3.5 (or equivalent) "Subject-Matter Exclusions" section, with primary-source citations.
7. Record the classification verbatim in the YAML's `parliamentary_initiative.distortions.subject_matter_restrictions` row.

When the existence gate fires (`exists: No` — no ILP mechanism at all), the row is a structural placeholder; use `None`. The category short-circuits to 0% before the distortion is applied.