

### 3.2 Holding Politicians Accountable (15%)

#### 3.2.1 Recall Referendums
**Documentation requirements:**
- Legal threshold for signatures with exact figures
- Country population data with source
- Percentage calculation based on eligible voters
- Signature collection methods with any restrictions
- Veto power provisions, if any

**Proportional Redistribution for National-Level Recall Referendums:**

When evaluating National-Level Recall Referendums, follow these redistribution rules:

1. **Mechanism Recognition:**
   - Full Parliament Recall refers to recalling an entire parliamentary chamber or the whole parliament.
   - Partial Parliament Recall refers to recalling a portion of a chamber but not the entire chamber.
   - Individual Legislator Recall refers to recalling specific members of parliament and is always weighted at 0%.

2. **Systems without Presidential Recall:**
   - In parliamentary systems with no direct presidential elections, remove the Presidential Recall component (50%) entirely.
   - Redistribute the weight proportionally among the existing recall mechanisms (Full Parliament Recall and/or Partial Parliament Recall).

3. **Weight Redistribution Scenarios:**
   - If only one type of recall mechanism exists (e.g., only Full Parliament Recall), assign it 100% of the National-Level Recall Referendums subcategory weight.
   - If two recall mechanisms exist (e.g., Presidential and Full Parliament), distribute the weight proportionally based on their original weights.
   - If a country has mechanisms for both Full Parliament Recall and Individual Legislator Recall, only the Full Parliament Recall contributes to the score (100% of subcategory weight).

4. **Unicameral System Considerations:**
   - In unicameral systems, Partial Parliament Recall is not applicable.
   - Only Presidential Recall (if applicable) and Full Parliament Recall can contribute to the score.

5. **Application Example:**
   - For a parliamentary system with only Full Parliament Recall: 100% of the subcategory weight goes to this mechanism.
   - For a presidential system with both Presidential Recall and Full Parliament Recall: weights are proportionally distributed as 50% and 50%.
   - For a presidential system with only Individual Legislator Recall: score is 0% for the National-Level Recall Referendums subcategory."

#### 3.2.2 Absence of Mechanism
When a mechanism doesn't exist:
```
IMPLEMENTATION STATUS:
"No legal provisions for [mechanism] exist in the constitutional or legal framework."

SCORE: 0% for this component
```

#### 3.2.3 Freedom of Information
**Documentation requirements:**
- Legal provisions on institutional coverage
- Response time requirements with exact days
- Cost structures with calculations showing percentage of minimum wage
- Documentation on oversight body, including independence measures


Here's a comprehensive note for the scoring guide regarding the Independent Accountability Institution bonus:

## 3.2.4 Independent Accountability Institution Bonus

## 3.2.4.1 Overview and Application

The DFI framework recognizes the significant democratic value of independent accountability institutions that monitor public officials' conduct. This bonus acknowledges their role in holding politicians accountable outside electoral cycles.

When a country has an independent institution that:
1) has the authority to investigate alleged misconduct by elected officials and public servants at any level,
2) can issue remedial actions (binding or non-binding),
3) is accessible to citizens through direct complaints, and
4) functions outside the regular electoral, legislative, and judicial processes,

the "Holding Politicians Accountable" category score receives a bonus as follows:
- **20% bonus** for institutions with legally binding remedial powers
- **10% bonus** for institutions with non-binding but influential recommendations

The total score for this category cannot exceed 100% (15% of total DFI), even if the bonus would mathematically result in a higher score.

### Example: Calculating Independent Accountability Institution Bonus

#### Example 1: Bonus with Cap
```
Country X Assessment:
Base Accountability Score Calculation:
- National-Level Recall Referendums: 10% × 60% = 6%
- Abrogative Processes: 25% × 20% = 5%
- Freedom of Information Laws: 95% × 20% = 19%
Base Total: 6% + 5% + 19% = 30%

Independent Institution: National Ombudsman Office
- Criteria 1: ✓ Investigates all elected officials including president
- Criteria 2: ✓ Issues binding corrective orders (confirmed by Supreme Court)
- Criteria 3: ✓ Direct citizen complaint system with 24 national offices
- Criteria 4: ✓ Independent commission, reports to parliament but operationally autonomous

Qualification: 20% bonus (binding remedial powers)

Final Calculation:
- Base score: 30%
- Plus bonus: 30% + 20% = 50%
- Final category score: 50% (no cap needed)
- DFI contribution: 50% × 15% = 7.5%
```

#### Example 2: Bonus with Cap Applied
```
Country Y Assessment:
Base Accountability Score Calculation:
- National-Level Recall Referendums: 75% × 60% = 45%
- Abrogative Processes: 80% × 20% = 16%
- Freedom of Information Laws: 100% × 20% = 20%
Base Total: 45% + 16% + 20% = 81%

Independent Institution: Anti-Corruption Authority
- Criteria 1: ✓ Investigates misconduct at all government levels
- Criteria 2: ✓ Recommendations with high compliance rate (85% in practice)
- Criteria 3: ✓ Online complaint portal and regional offices
- Criteria 4: ✓ Independent appointment process, no government interference

Qualification: 10% bonus (non-binding but influential)

Final Calculation:
- Base score: 81%
- Plus bonus: 81% + 10% = 91%
- Final category score: 91% (no cap needed)
- DFI contribution: 91% × 15% = 13.65%
```

#### Example 3: Bonus Exceeding Cap (would be rare)
```
Country Z Assessment:
Base Accountability Score Calculation:
- National-Level Recall Referendums: 90% × 60% = 54%
- Abrogative Processes: 100% × 20% = 20%
- Freedom of Information Laws: 100% × 20% = 20%
Base Total: 54% + 20% + 20% = 94%

Independent Institution: National Integrity Commission
- All four criteria met with binding enforcement powers

Qualification: 20% bonus (binding remedial powers)

Final Calculation:
- Base score: 94%
- Plus bonus: 94% + 20% = 114%
- Final category score: 100% (capped)
- DFI contribution: 100% × 15% = 15%
```

#### Error Example 
```
INCORRECT CALCULATION:
- Base score: 13.24%
- With bonus: 13.24% + 10% = 23.24%
- Reported final: 100% ❌ (unexplained jump)
- DFI contribution: 100% × 15% = 15% ❌

CORRECT CALCULATION:
- Base score: 13.24%
- With bonus: 13.24% + 10% = 23.24%
- Final category score: 23.24% ✓
- DFI contribution: 23.24% × 15% = 3.49% ✓
```


## 3.2.4.2 Evaluation Criteria

### Authority to Investigate
The institution must have formal legal powers to investigate misconduct by elected officials at all levels, including the ability to:
- Access relevant documents and information
- Summon witnesses and take testimony
- Initiate investigations independently or based on complaints
- Investigate high-ranking officials including the head of government/state

### Nature of Remedial Powers
**Binding remedial actions** (20% bonus) must meet at least one of these criteria:
- Constitutional or high court ruling confirming the binding nature of directives
- Legal provisions explicitly making the institution's directives enforceable
- Clear enforcement mechanism (e.g., through courts) when directives are ignored

**Non-binding remedial actions** (10% bonus) must meet at least one of these criteria:
- Established track record of high compliance with recommendations
- Formal reporting channels to parliament for non-compliance
- Ability to publicize findings and recommendations
- Special powers in extreme cases (e.g., prosecution referral)

### Citizen Accessibility
The institution must:
- Accept complaints directly from citizens without intermediaries
- Have transparent and accessible complaint procedures
- Not require substantial fees or legal representation
- Maintain reasonable geographic accessibility (physical or digital)

### Institutional Independence
The institution must:
- Be established by constitution or national legislation
- Have protection from arbitrary removal (e.g., fixed terms, special removal procedures)
- Have budgetary independence or protected funding
- Be free from direct executive control over operations

## 3.2.4.3 Example Applications

### Example 1: South Africa (Public Protector)
```
- Institution name: Public Protector
- Legal foundation: Chapter 9 of Constitution of South Africa, 1996
- Investigative powers: Authority to investigate any conduct in state affairs alleged to be improper
- Remedial action classification: Binding - Constitutional Court ruling in Economic Freedom Fighters v. Speaker (2016) confirmed binding nature
- Citizen accessibility: Direct complaint system with offices across the country
- Independence guarantees: 7-year term, removal requires 2/3 parliamentary majority
- Track record: Investigated multiple presidents, cabinet ministers
- Application determination: Qualifies for 20% bonus (binding remedial actions)
```

### Example 2: United Kingdom (Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards)
```
- Institution name: Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards
- Legal foundation: House of Commons Standing Order No. 150 (as amended 2019)
- Investigative powers: Direct authority to investigate breaches of the MPs'
  Code of Conduct, including investigating the Prime Minister and all
  government ministers in their capacity as MPs
- Remedial action classification: Non-binding - Commissioner recommends
  sanctions; House of Commons must approve before they take effect.
  Compliance rate exceeds 99% in practice through political pressure.
- Citizen accessibility: Any member of the public can submit complaints
  directly without charge
- Independence guarantees: Fixed 5-year non-renewable term; removal only
  by House resolution; budget through House Administration (not Government)
- Track record: Investigation of Prime Minister Boris Johnson 2022-2023
  (Partygate), resulting in finding that he "deliberately misled Parliament"
- Application determination: Qualifies for 10% bonus (non-binding but
  influential remedial actions)
```

### Example 3: Sweden (Parliamentary Ombudsmen) — DOES NOT QUALIFY

This negative example illustrates the importance of Criterion 1 (Authority
to Investigate elected officials). An institution that fails any one of
the four criteria does not qualify, regardless of how well it satisfies
the others.

```
- Institution name: Parliamentary Ombudsmen (Justitieombudsmannen, JO)
- Legal foundation: Instrument of Government (constitutional law) +
  Act with Instructions for the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (2023:499)
- Investigative powers: Supervises public-administration officials only
- Statutory exclusion: Section 15 of Act 2023:499 expressly excludes
  from JO supervision: "1. members of the Riksdag, 2. the Riksdag Board,
  [...] 4. the Government or Ministers, [...] 6. members of municipal
  and county council assemblies."
- Criterion 1 outcome: FAILS — JO's mandate does not extend to elected
  officials. Supervision of ministers is instead carried out by the
  Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution (Konstitutionsutskottet),
  which is itself composed of elected members and is not independent
  per Criterion 4.
- Other criteria: Citizen accessibility (Criterion 3) and Institutional
  independence (Criterion 4) are well-satisfied; remedial powers
  (Criterion 2) are non-binding with high compliance — but Criterion 1
  failure controls.
- Application determination: Does not qualify for the bonus
```

**Common Criterion 1 disqualification pattern**: Institutions whose
statutory mandate scopes to "public administration" or "public-sector
employees" generally do not extend to elected officials. Always verify
the institution's enabling statute against the four-criteria test;
do not infer qualification from the institution's name (e.g.,
"Ombudsman") or general reputation. The Netherlands National Ombudsman
fails Criterion 1 for the same reason as Sweden's JO; Spain's Defensor
del Pueblo is similarly limited under CE Article 54 to "la Administración."

## 3.2.4.4 Calculation Method

1. Calculate the standard "Holding Politicians Accountable" category score using established methodology

2. Apply bonus: Standard score + 20% or Standard score + 10%

3. If result exceeds 100%, cap at 100%

4. Calculate contribution to DFI: Final category score × 15%

Example calculation with 40% base score:
- With binding remedial powers: 40% + 20% = 60%
- With non-binding remedial powers: 40% + 10% = 50%

## 3.2.5 Weight Distribution in National-Level Recall Referendums

When evaluating National-Level Recall Referendums (60% of the Accountability category), the distribution of weights depends on which recall mechanisms exist in a country's constitutional framework. This section provides clear guidance on how to calculate weights when not all recall types are applicable.

### 3.2.5.1 Standard Weight Distribution

In the standard case where all recall mechanisms are potentially applicable:
- Presidential Recall: 50%
- Full Parliament Recall: 50% 
- Partial Parliament Recall: 25%
- Individual Legislator Recall: Always 0%

### 3.2.5.2 Weight Redistribution for Non-Presidential Systems

When a country has no direct presidential elections or no presidential office:

1. **Remove Presidential Recall component** (50% of the subcategory weight)
2. **Redistribute this weight proportionally** among the remaining mechanisms
3. **Calculate new weights** using this formula:
   ```
   New weight = Original weight ÷ Sum of all applicable original weights × 100%
   ```

#### Example Calculation:

For a parliamentary system with only Full Parliament and Partial Parliament recall mechanisms:
- Sum of applicable original weights: 50% + 25% = 75%
- New Full Parliament Recall weight: 50% ÷ 75% × 100% = 66.67%
- New Partial Parliament Recall weight: 25% ÷ 75% × 100% = 33.33%

#### Example Calculation with only Full Parliament Recall:
- Sum of applicable original weights: 50%
- New Full Parliament Recall weight: 50% ÷ 50% × 100% = 100%

### 3.2.5.3 Important Rules for Application

1. **Individual Legislator Recall always receives 0%**: Even when redistribution occurs, this mechanism never receives any weight as it does not qualify as a true recall referendum in the DFI framework.

2. **When only one recall mechanism exists**: It receives 100% of the available weight for the National-Level Recall Referendums subcategory.

3. **Documentation requirement**: In assessment reports, explicitly state:
   ```
   RECALL MECHANISMS PRESENT:
   - Presidential Recall: [Yes/No/Not Applicable]
   - Full Parliament Recall: [Yes/No]
   - Partial Parliament Recall: [Yes/No]
   - Individual Legislator Recall: [Yes/No] (always weighted at 0%)
   
   WEIGHT CALCULATION:
   - Sum of applicable original weights: [X%]
   - Presidential Recall: [Original weight] ÷ [X%] × 100% = [New weight]
   - Full Parliament Recall: [Original weight] ÷ [X%] × 100% = [New weight]
   - Partial Parliament Recall: [Original weight] ÷ [X%] × 100% = [New weight]
   ```

This methodology ensures that countries are evaluated based on the recall mechanisms relevant to their constitutional structure, while maintaining proportional relationships between different mechanism types.

## 3.2.5.4 Classifying Abrogative Referendums for Accountability Assessment

Proper classification of abrogative referendums is critical for accurate DFI scoring, as these mechanisms fall under the Accountability category rather than the Referenda category. This section provides definitive criteria for identification and classification.

### 3.2.5.5 Definition and Essential Characteristics

An abrogative referendum is a mechanism that:
- Allows citizens to challenge and potentially reject laws **that have already been enacted**
- Functions as a citizen veto or repeal power against existing legislation
- Operates reactively rather than proactively in the legislative process

The defining characteristic is that abrogative referendums deal with **already-enacted laws** rather than proposed legislation or new policy directions.

### 3.2.5.6 Distinguished from Other Referendum Types

| Abrogative Referendum (Category 2) | Legislative Referendum (Category 4) | Constitutional Amendment (Category 7) |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Repeals existing laws | Enacts new legislation | Changes constitutional provisions |
| Retroactive (addresses past legislative actions) | Proactive (creates new legal provisions) | Fundamental (alters basic governance structure) |
| Requires law to be in force already | Deals with legislative proposals | Modifies the constitutional framework |
| Acts as check on parliament | Acts as alternative to parliament | Supersedes ordinary legislative process |

### 3.2.5.7 Examples of Clear Abrogative Mechanisms

- **Italy**: Citizens can collect 500,000 signatures to trigger a referendum to repeal an existing law (Art. 75 of Constitution)
- **Switzerland**: Optional referendum allowing 50,000 citizens to challenge laws passed by parliament within 100 days of official publication
- **Uruguay**: Citizens can repeal laws through signature collection within one year of promulgation

### 3.2.5.8 When Legislative Referendums Can Be Treated as Equivalent to Abrogative

The note in the DFI framework states: "citizen-initiated legislative referendums are treated as equivalent to abrogative referendums when they provide citizens with effective power to challenge parliamentary decisions."

This equivalence applies only in specific circumstances:
1. When the legislative referendum can target recently passed but not-yet-implemented legislation
2. When it functions effectively as a veto or blocking mechanism against parliament
3. When citizens can use it reactively to challenge specific parliamentary output
4. When the timing allows it to serve as an accountability mechanism rather than purely a legislative creation tool

**Example**: In some systems, citizens can trigger a referendum on legislation that has been approved by parliament but has not yet taken effect due to implementation periods. These function similarly to abrogative mechanisms though technically they address not-yet-implemented laws.

### 3.2.5.9 Assessment Documentation Requirements

When classifying a referendum mechanism, document:
```
ABROGATIVE MECHANISM DETERMINATION:
- Constitutional/legal basis: [citation of specific provisions]
- Target of mechanism: [already effective laws / pending legislation / both]
- Timing constraints: [time period after enactment when challenge is possible]
- Functional purpose: [repeal or veto / creation of new law]
- Classification decision: [Abrogative (Category 2) / Legislative (Category 4)]
- Justification: [specific reasoning with reference to defining characteristics]
```

This structured approach ensures consistent classification across different constitutional systems and prevents category misapplication that could distort DFI scores.

## 3.2.5.10 Evaluating Cost Barriers to Information Access

The cost of accessing public information can significantly impact citizens' practical ability to hold government accountable. This section provides a standardized methodology for assessing cost barriers in Freedom of Information systems.

### 3.2.5.11 Digital Format Cost Assessment (50% of Cost Component)

Digital format costs have a binary evaluation:
- **Free digital access (100%)**: No charge for receiving information in digital format
- **Paid digital access (0%)**: Any charge imposed for digital format information

For this component, even minimal fees for digital access result in a 0% score, as digital information should be provided at no cost in modern information systems.

### 3.2.5.12 Paper Format Cost Calculation (50% of Cost Component)

Paper format costs are evaluated against the country's hourly minimum wage to ensure comparable assessment across different economies:

**Calculation Formula:**
```
Cost Percentage = (Cost per page ÷ Hourly minimum wage) × 100
```

**Score Categories:**
- **Free or minimal cost (100%)**: ≤ 0.1% of hourly minimum wage per page
- **Moderate cost (50%)**: 0.1% - 0.5% of hourly minimum wage per page
- **High cost (0%)**: > 0.5% of hourly minimum wage per page

### 3.2.5.13 Calculation Examples

**Example 1: Country with hourly minimum wage of $10.00**
- Paper copy cost: $0.05 per page
- Calculation: ($0.05 ÷ $10.00) × 100 = 0.5%
- Classification: Moderate cost (50%)

**Example 2: Country with hourly minimum wage of €12.00**
- Paper copy cost: €0.01 per page
- Calculation: (€0.01 ÷ €12.00) × 100 = 0.083%
- Classification: Free or minimal cost (100%)

### 3.2.5.14 Countries Without Hourly Minimum Wage

The hourly minimum wage figure for §2.C is determined per **General Guidelines — Hourly Minimum Wage Proxy**, which sets out the four-rung cascade (statutory hourly → monthly÷160 → lowest public clerical → 60% of public-administration average) and is the single canonical source across DFI categories. The cascade is recorded in the country's YAML `hourly_min_wage.source` field, so the figure used by §2.C is identical to the figure used by Cat 1 §1.1.5; no separate per-category wage discovery is required.

**Documentation requirement**: the country YAML's `hourly_min_wage` block records `value`, `source` (the cascade rung used), `currency`, and a `note` capturing the calculation trace and source citation. Reviewers can audit the wage-discovery decision from that block.

### 3.2.5.15 Total Cost Component Calculation

To calculate the final cost component score (40% of Practical Accessibility):

1. Digital Format Cost Score × 50% = Digital contribution
2. Paper Format Cost Score × 50% = Paper contribution
3. Digital contribution + Paper contribution = Total Cost Score

**Example:**
- Digital Format: Free access = 100% × 50% = 50%
- Paper Format: Moderate cost = 50% × 50% = 25%
- Total Cost Score: 50% + 25% = 75% of Cost component
- Contribution to Practical Accessibility: 75% × 40% = 30% of Practical Accessibility
