
### Ability to Change the Constitution (15%)

#### Handling Multiple Constitutional Amendment Processes

##### Process Type Definition

In the DFI framework, "Process Type" specifically refers to the method and institutional framework through which constitutional amendment proposals are drafted and developed - focusing on who creates the actual text of the amendment and how it is formulated before being submitted for approval.

This is distinct from:
- Who can initiate a constitutional amendment process (covered under "Initiation Methods")
- How the amendment is ultimately approved (covered under "Approval Mechanisms")

Process Type specifically examines the drafting stage - which body or group of people actually writes the text of the constitutional amendment and what procedure they follow. The DFI framework recognizes several distinct models for this drafting process, each with different democratic characteristics:

- Parliamentary Process: The regular legislature drafts the amendment
- Constitutional Convention: A specially elected body separate from the legislature drafts it
- Citizens' Assembly: A randomly selected group of citizens drafts it
- Expert Commission: Legal and constitutional experts draft it
- Direct Democracy Process: Citizens or interest groups draft it (as in popular initiatives)
- Hybrid Process: Multiple institutions collaborate on drafting

This focus on the drafting stage is important because who creates the constitutional text has significant implications for whose interests and perspectives are represented in the proposed changes to the fundamental law of the land.

##### Identifying Multiple Process Types

Many countries have more than one constitutionally defined pathway for amending their constitution. When evaluating Process Type, assessors must:

1. **Identify all available processes**: Thoroughly investigate all constitutionally established methods for drafting constitutional amendments
   
2. **Consider both formal and used processes**: Include all processes that are legally available, even if some are used more frequently than others

3. **Document each process separately**: Before calculating the average, document each available process with:
   - Constitutional basis (article numbers)
   - Who drafts the amendment text
   - How the drafting body is constituted or selected
   - The precise classification within the DFI framework

##### Calculation Method for Multiple Processes

**When a country's constitutional system permits multiple process types for creating constitutional amendments, the average score of all available processes is calculated.**

**Example: Switzerland**

Switzerland has two distinct constitutional amendment processes:

1. **Parliamentary Process** (Federal Assembly drafts amendments)
   - Classification: Parliamentary Process
   - Score: 39%
   - Constitutional basis: Federal Constitution, Article 192-193

2. **Direct Democracy Process** (Citizens draft amendments through initiatives)
   - Classification: Direct Democracy Process
   - Score: 10% 
   - Constitutional basis: Federal Constitution, Article 138-139

**Correct calculation**: (39% + 10%) ÷ 2 = 24.5%

##### Special Cases and Considerations

1. **Inactive or dormant processes**: Include processes even if they haven't been used in recent history, as long as they remain constitutionally valid

2. **Processes with restrictions**: If a process is restricted to certain parts of the constitution or specific circumstances, still include it in the average, but document these limitations

3. **Optional alternative processes**: If the constitution provides for optional special processes (e.g., a constituent assembly that could be convened but is not mandatory), include these in the average

4. **Documentation requirement**: 
   ```
   MULTIPLE PROCESSES NOTE:
   Process 1: [Name, score, constitutional basis]
   Process 2: [Name, score, constitutional basis]
   ...
   Average calculation: ([Score 1] + [Score 2] + ...) ÷ [Number of processes] = [Final score]
   ```

##### Verification Steps for Multiple Processes

- [ ] Have all constitutionally available amendment processes been identified?
- [ ] Is each process properly classified according to the DFI framework definitions?
- [ ] Has the average been correctly calculated?
- [ ] Are there any unused but legally available processes that have been overlooked?
- [ ] Has each process been properly documented with its constitutional basis?

This approach ensures that the Process Type score accurately reflects the full range of constitutional amendment possibilities available within a country's legal framework, regardless of which processes are more commonly used in practice.

#### Parliamentary-Initiated Calibration (Framework v3.1)

Framework v3.1 (introduced 2026-05-07) calibrates the four Parliamentary-Initiated options on a clean 10-point gradient:

| Option | Score | Frictions |
|---|---:|---|
| Simple majority in a single chamber | 60% | None — easiest parliamentary route |
| Simple majority in both chambers | 50% | Chamber count |
| Supermajority (≥2/3) in a single chamber | 50% | Threshold height |
| Supermajority (≥2/3) in both chambers | 40% | Both frictions |

##### Rationale

The §7.1 Initiation row asks one question: **how easy is it to get a constitutional-amendment proposal onto the table?** This is a proposal-generation step, not a constitutional-quality safeguard.

Two variables make initiation harder: **chamber count** (one chamber → two chambers) and **threshold height** (simple → supermajority). Each acts as a friction on initiation. The framework treats them as additive — each friction deducts 10 percentage points from the easiest-route ceiling of 60%.

Supermajority thresholds carry deliberative virtue *at the approval stage* (where the Cat 7 framework correctly rewards 2/3 thresholds with higher Approval-Mechanism scores), but at the **initiation stage**, harder ≠ better. A high threshold simply means it's harder to get a proposal generated. Treating supermajority as having deliberative virtue at initiation would double-count a feature the framework already prices correctly inside Approval Mechanisms.

##### Hierarchy preserved

The 60% ceiling for the easiest parliamentary route sits below the 70% floor for the hardest citizen-initiated route. Citizens initiating constitutional change beats parliament initiating constitutional change — the framework's principle that direct citizen agency is the gold standard remains intact across the recalibration.

##### Bicameral-override note

When a bicameral system has a chamber-override mechanism (one chamber can ultimately pass amendments at simple majority despite the other chamber's opposition, after a delay or via override procedure), classify under "Simple majority in a single chamber: 60%" rather than "Simple majority in both chambers: 50%". The override mechanism makes the "both chambers" requirement nominal rather than substantive.

#### Constitutional Change Category Penalties

Penalties in the "Ability to Change the Constitution" category (Category 7) apply specifically to the maximum score for this category (15% of total DFI) rather than to other categories or the overall DFI score. These penalties address specific institutional barriers and restrictions that limit democratic control over constitutional reform.

##### Types of Constitutional Change Penalties

The DFI framework includes the following penalties for distortions to the democratic process of changing the constitution:

| Penalty Condition | Penalty Value | Applied To |
|-------------------|---------------|------------|
| Monarch's veto over constitutional amendments | -100% | Constitutional Change category |
| Religious authorities' veto over constitutional amendments | -100% | Constitutional Change category |
| Military veto over constitutional amendments | -100% | Constitutional Change category |
| Unelected body veto over constitutional amendments | -100% | Constitutional Change category |
| Provisions protecting changes to elite privileges | -70% | Constitutional Change category |
| Provisions protecting changes to anti-democratic state structures | -70% | Constitutional Change category |

**Note**: For penalties related to "Actual use in practice (over the last 100 years)":
- When a power exists but has not been used in practice during the current constitutional order, half of the impact score applies
- When a power has been used in practice during the current constitutional order, the full impact score applies

##### Clarification on Eternity Clauses

For the purposes of applying penalties related to "provisions protecting changes to elite privileges" or "provisions protecting changes to anti-democratic state structures":

1. **Definition of "Eternity Clauses"**: These penalties apply specifically to constitutional provisions that make certain parts of the constitution completely unamendable through normal constitutional procedures (true "eternity clauses").

2. **Not Applicable to**: Provisions that make amendments more difficult but still possible through regular constitutional processes, even if they require additional consent or higher thresholds.

3. **Federal Arrangements**: Constitutional provisions protecting federal arrangements (such as equal representation of states regardless of population) are not automatically considered "anti-democratic structures" if they serve legitimate power-balancing functions within a federal system.

##### Example: U.S. Article V Provision on Senate Representation

Article V of the U.S. Constitution states: "No State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate."

This provision:
- Is not a true eternity clause because amendment is technically possible through the regular amendment process (with state consent)
- Protects a federal arrangement rather than an anti-democratic structure
- Does not trigger the -70% penalty for "provisions protecting changes to anti-democratic state structures"

##### Calculation Example

**Country A**:
- Constitutional Change base score: 65%
- Distortion: Monarch can veto constitutional amendments (unused in practice)
- Penalty: -50% (half of -100% because unused)
- Final Constitutional Change score: 65% × (1 - 0.5) = 32.5%
- Contribution to DFI: 32.5% × 15% = 4.875%

**Country B**:
- Constitutional Change base score: 70%
- Distortion: True eternity clause protecting aristocratic privileges
- Penalty: -70%
- Final Constitutional Change score: 70% × (1 - 0.7) = 21%
- Contribution to DFI: 21% × 15% = 3.15%

This approach ensures that penalties for distortions to constitutional change processes are applied consistently across different political systems while recognizing legitimate variations in constitutional design.

### 7. Multiple Process Types for Constitutional Amendments

#### Country Example: Italy
```
Process 1: Parliamentary Process
- Constitutional basis: Constitution of Italy, Articles 138-139
- Drafting body: Parliament
- Score: 39/100 = 39%

Process 2: Referendum Process (for rejecting parliamentary amendments)
- Constitutional basis: Constitution of Italy, Article 138
- Drafting body: Parliament with citizen veto power
- Score: 55/100 = 55%

Average calculation: (39% + 55%) ÷ 2 = 47%
Final Constitutional Change Process Type score: 47%
```

### Constitutional Limitations on Democracy

When constitutional provisions explicitly limit democratic mechanisms:
```
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS:
"[Quote the exact limitation]"
Source: Constitution, Article X

EFFECT ON SCORING:
"This constitutional provision prevents the existence of [mechanism], resulting in a score of 0% for this component."
```
