# Per-Category Research Agent Guide

This document is the standing instruction set for any agent (or human researcher) producing a per-category research report for a country in the DFI corpus. It tells you exactly what to read, how to structure the output, what to compute (and what NOT to compute, when special-research files already cover it), and what pitfalls to avoid per category.

The running example throughout is **Germany** — the country in active research at the time this guide was written. Germany has since been added to the corpus; the worked-example snippets in each per-category section preserve the methodology calls and pitfalls surfaced during that research. The guide is written generally; substitute any other country wherever Germany appears.

---

## How to use this guide

1. Read the **Cross-cutting prerequisites** section once.
2. Identify which category you're researching.
3. Open the matching **Per-category section** (Cat 1 through Cat 7).
4. Follow the **Output specification** at the end.

The guide assumes you have read tooling access (the framework spec docx, scoring guidelines markdown, methodology files, and existing corpus research as worked examples) and write access to the country's `Research/` folder.

---

## Cross-cutting prerequisites

These apply to every category. Read once before starting your first per-category report.

### Core principle: resolve all research-related issues at the research stage

Every row in your output must carry an unambiguous **PROPOSED CLASSIFICATION** that the YAML author can transcribe mechanically. The handoff is one-way:
- Research produces row-by-row classifications resolved against the methodology
- YAML author transcribes; Builder runs mechanically; no methodology calls happen at YAML or build time

When a row appears ambiguous during research, **resolve it before submitting the report**:
1. Re-read the framework spec for the row, all options, and any notes.
2. Re-read the matching Scoring Guidelines section (especially worked examples — the Scoring Guidelines often resolve borderline cases by example).
3. Re-read the General guidelines for cross-cutting rules.
4. Check the existing corpus for a structurally analogous country whose research file resolved the same question.
5. If after these four steps the row is still genuinely ambiguous, use the Uncertainty Note format from General guidelines — but **only with alternatives narrowed by methodology**, not as a place to defer the call.

A "flagged for YAML-author review" classification is **not** an acceptable output. If you want to flag it, surface the question explicitly to the user during the research session before finalising the file. Verification will return any unresolved row to research with a request to resolve.

### Required reading

| File | Why |
|---|---|
| `New scoring guidelines/General guidelines.md` | Cross-category calculation principles, country-size buckets, source-documentation hierarchy, the strict "no invented intermediate scores" rule, and the standardized Uncertainty Note format. Load-bearing for every category. |
| `Research guidelines/DFI - Research Phase Guidelines.md` | Master research methodology — when to use direct quotes from law, how to handle ambiguity, how to document gaps. |
| `Research guidelines/DFI - Research formatting guidelines.md` | Output format specification — section headings, RESEARCH FINDINGS / LEGAL BASIS / SOURCE / PROPOSED CLASSIFICATION subsections per row. |
| The framework spec for your category | Authoritative answer to "what classification labels exist, what does each mean, what penalty does each carry." |
| The Scoring Guidelines section for your category | Operational scoring rules. For Cat 1 specifically, §1.3 + §1.4 are now load-bearing for the disproportionality and intent rows. |

### Country-profile inputs

Before drafting, establish these facts and put them at the top of your report:

- **Population** → drives Small (<10M) / Medium (10–50M) / Large (>50M) bucket per General guidelines
- **Hourly minimum wage** → benchmark for §1.1.5 (Cat 1) and §2.C (Cat 2) cost rows. For countries without a statutory minimum wage (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Switzerland, Italy, Cyprus, Austria, Singapore — sectoral CBAs only), apply the four-rung cascade in **General guidelines — Hourly Minimum Wage Proxy**: rung 1 statutory hourly → rung 2 monthly÷160 → rung 3 lowest public clerical → rung 4 60% of public-administration average. Record `value`, `source` (one of the four canonical labels), `currency`, and a `note` with the calculation trace. The Builder validates the source label at YAML load time; the same hourly figure feeds both Cat 1 §1.1.5 and Cat 2 §2.C.
- **Constitutional system** → bicameral or unicameral; direct or indirect presidential election (or no presidency); upper-house composition (drawn districts / fixed territorial units / indirectly elected / appointed); lower-house electoral-system family (FPTP / list-PR / mixed parallel / compensatory MMP / nationwide PR)
- **Federal vs. unitary** → matters for Cat 6 and Cat 7
- **Most recent national election date** → for Cat 1 special research and the disproportionality assessment

Worked example for Germany:

```
Country: Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
Population: ~83.5 million → Large
Hourly minimum wage (2025): €12.82
Constitutional system: Federal parliamentary republic (Grundgesetz 1949)
Legislature: Bicameral
  - Bundestag (lower house): directly elected, 630 seats post-2023 reform, compensatory MMP
  - Bundesrat (upper house): indirectly elected (Land government delegations, 3-6 per Land)
Direct presidential election: NO (Bundespräsident elected indirectly by the Bundesversammlung every 5 years)
Most recent federal election: 23 February 2025 (21st Bundestag, snap election)
```

### Source-documentation hierarchy

Per General guidelines:

1. Constitutional provisions
2. Organic laws / statutes governing the institution
3. Regular legislation
4. Established case law / judicial interpretations
5. Procedural rules and regulations
6. Credible secondary sources (only when primary sources are insufficient)

Cite article and section numbers directly. Use exact quotes from the law text in the LEGAL BASIS subsection of each row.

### Output format per row

For every row in the framework spec, document:

```
**RESEARCH FINDINGS**: [What does the country's law actually say or do? Plain-language description.]

**LEGAL BASIS**: "[Direct quote from the constitution/statute/regulation]" (Article X, Section Y)

**SOURCE**: [URL, document title, date, paragraph]

**PROPOSED CLASSIFICATION**: [The exact spec option label that best matches the findings]
```

When a row is structurally not applicable (e.g., presidential voting methods in a country with no direct presidential election), explicitly write `Not applicable — [one-sentence reason]` rather than leaving the row blank.

When a row's classification is ambiguous, use the standardized Uncertainty Note format from General guidelines (see template above).

### What to NOT recompute

If special-research files for the country already exist in `Countries - results/<Country>/Special research/`, **do not redo their work**. Cite the special-research file in the relevant row of the main report and copy the proposed classification from the file. The mapping from special-research file to main-report row is in each per-category section below.

### Strict-adherence rule

Per General guidelines, use only exact spec options. Do not invent intermediate scores, partial points, or proportional allocations. If the spec offers `5 points / 0 points / -25% penalty`, those are the only valid scoring options for that row.

**Always fetch the exact spec-label list before classifying.** Use:

```bash
python3 build_template.py --list-options <category.row>
# e.g., python3 build_template.py --list-options elections.1.1
#       python3 build_template.py --list-options safeguards.judges
#       python3 build_template.py --list-options "constitutional_change.approval_mechanisms"
```

This is the only authoritative source for the exact label strings the YAML accepts. **Near-spec labels are not acceptable.** The Germany campaign surfaced agents writing "Power exists but no actual use in practice during current constitutional order" instead of the exact spec label "Monarch's power over PM selection — not used in practice"; Spain's Cat 1 surfaced "Low threshold (3% or below)" instead of the exact label "Low (2.1–3.5%)". Both required research-stage corrections.

### Hedge language never substitutes for sourced quantification

Several DFI rows use a binary **"used in practice / not used in practice"** classification that controls a halved-penalty rule (Cat 1 §1.6 distortions; all Cat 7 §7.4 distortions; Cat 6 institutional-behavior rows). The methodology test is binary over a 100-year window. There is no "rarely" tier.

When a primary or secondary source describes a power as "rarely used," "occasionally invoked," "from time to time," "in extremis," "theoretically possible," or "in practice not used" — these are **hedge phrases, not classifications**. The researcher must verify the empirical record with sourced numbers before mapping to either side of the binary:

- If the power has been exercised **even once** within the time window → **"used in practice"** (full penalty).
- If literally **never invoked** within the time window → **"not used in practice"** (halved penalty).

**Worked example — Canada Senate veto (Cat 7 unelected upper house veto)**:

Source description: "The Senate's absolute veto over ordinary legislation is rarely used in practice."

Hedge word: "rarely."

Quantification step: Senate of Canada records show **75 government bills rejected 2000-2013** (~5-6/year). The most prominent recent example is **Bill C-311 (Climate Change Accountability Act, defeated 43-32 in December 2010 without committee review)**.

Resolution: The empirical record contains documented uses within the 100-year window. The hedge "rarely" was not a classification; it was a frequency descriptor. The correct mapping is **"used in practice"** (full penalty), not "not used in practice" (halved penalty).

**Worked example — UK Royal Assent (Cat 7 monarch's veto over legislation)**:

Source description: "Royal Assent has not been refused since Queen Anne's veto on the Scottish Militia Bill 1708."

Hedge word: none (already quantified — "since 1708" is a sourced anchor).

Quantification step: The 100-year window starts from the country's current constitutional order. The last documented refusal pre-dates that window by several centuries.

Resolution: **"Not used in practice"** (halved penalty). The classification is the same one that applies to Norway's monarch (no refusal since 1884) and Japan's Emperor (Article 4 expressly removes any veto authority). Hedge-word verification was unnecessary because the source was already quantified.

**Practical rule for the researcher**: any classification call you make on a binary "used in practice" row needs to cite either (a) a documented exercise within the time window with primary-source attribution, or (b) primary-source authority (statute, doctrine, or quantified historical record) confirming literal non-use. "Rarely" without numbers fails verification and the row will be returned for revision.

### Logging spec issues

When a research-stage classification diverges from a framework worked example or surfaces an internal inconsistency in the methodology documents, log it in `notes/spec-issues.md` with:
- The category and row affected
- A description of the divergence
- The resolution adopted in the research file
- A recommendation for the next framework/Scoring-Guidelines revision

Examples already logged:
- Germany Cat 6 §6.3 Electoral Commission — framework example assignment (Parliamentary Supermajority Model) factually inapplicable to BWahlG §9; resolved to Ministry-Led Electoral Administration per §3.7.1 strict-adherence
- Cat 5 §3.4.3 — initiation-vs-reception clarification + corrected Bürgerrat Klima → Bürgerrat Ernährung worked example
- Cat 6 §6.0.1 — sub-component weights total cell typo (14% → 15%)

Logged spec issues become an audit trail and feed future methodology revisions.

---

## Cat 1 — Elections (25% of DFI)

The largest and most subtle category. **Five special-research files** feed into specific rows of the main report.

### Reading list (in order)

1. `Main DFI framework/DFI - elections 1.docx` — framework spec
2. `New scoring guidelines/DFI - Scoring Guidelines 1 - Elections.md` — operational scoring rules; sections §3.1.1 (non-presidential systems), §3.1.2 (electoral threshold applicability), §3.1.3 (transparency), §3.1.4 (campaign finance), §3.1.6 (upper-house design), §3.1.7 (constitutional deadlock distinction), §3.1.8 (penalty calculation), §3.1.9 (redistribution rules), §1.3 (disproportionality), §1.4 (intent) are all load-bearing
3. The five special-research files for the country (when they exist):
   - `<Country> - Foreign donation loopholes - special research.md` → cited at §1.1.2.1
   - `<Country> - Public Funding part 1 - special research.md` → cited at §1.1.4
   - `<Country> - Public Funding part 2 - special research.md` → cited at §1.1.4
   - `<Country> - Electoral disproportionality - special research.md` → cited at §1.6 disproportionality row
   - `<Country> - Intentional gerrymandering - special research.md` → cited at §1.6 intent row
4. **Worked exemplar**: pick the structurally closest corpus country. Useful comparators by structural type:
   - **Federal parliamentary republic, no direct presidency, MMP**: Germany
   - **Bicameral parliamentary republic, list-PR with regional constituencies + Senate**: Poland, Spain
   - **Parliamentary monarchy with constitutional monarch**: UK, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Japan, Norway, Canada
   - **Federal presidential republic**: USA, Mexico, Colombia, South Africa
   - **Unitary presidential republic**: Costa Rica, Peru, South Korea
   - **Federal directorial republic**: Switzerland (rich Cat 4)
   - **Unicameral parliamentary**: Latvia, Norway, Sweden
   - Read the closest match's `Countries - results/<Country>/Research/<Country> - Elections - report.md` for format and per-row reasoning.

### Country-profile inputs (Cat 1 specifically)

Beyond the cross-cutting checklist:
- Hourly minimum wage (for §1.1.5 transparency disclosure threshold)
- Direct presidential election? — controls §1.5 applicability and the §1.1.4 halving rule
- Lower-house electoral system family — controls §1.4 (Electoral Threshold) applicability

### Section-by-section walkthrough

#### §1.1 Campaign Finance Controls

Five sub-rows (§1.1.1 Campaign Account Structure, §1.1.2 Donation Restrictions, §1.1.3 Spending Limits, §1.1.4 Public Funding, §1.1.5 Transparency).

**§1.1.2.1 Foreign Source Donations** has both the standard classification rows AND a separate Loopholes row that triggers the -25% category-wide penalty. Cite the country's Foreign donation loopholes special-research file for the Loopholes row's classification.

**§1.1.4 Public Funding** has multiple sub-rows. Cite the country's Public Funding parts 1 + 2 special-research files. The §1.1.4 halving rule is mechanically applied by the Builder when the YAML's `direct_president` field is set correctly — but the *researcher* must explicitly note in the report whether the country has a direct presidential election (so the YAML author knows which value to set).

**Pitfalls:**
- Threshold-bonus applies only when threshold is **strictly less than 3%**; a 3.0%-exact threshold does NOT qualify. But "threshold" here is the *funding-qualification* threshold, not the *seat-allocation* threshold — these can differ. Spain's seat-allocation threshold is 3% per province, but its funding-qualification threshold is empirically below 3% national vote share (UPN qualified at 0.21%) because qualification is seat-based and regional concentration suffices. The bonus question asks about funding qualification, not seat allocation.
- **Coverage Level brackets are exact**: High coverage (≥70%) / Medium coverage (50–70%) / Low coverage (30–50%) / Very low coverage (<30%) / Not present. Do **not** invent non-spec brackets like "(40–70%)" — this drift was caught during Germany's verification (research file proposed Medium for 47–49% coverage; correct classification per spec is Low). Germany sits at upper-end Low; Spain sits at High (~100% capped).
- Foreign-donation Loopholes is a separate row from Foreign-donation Restrictions; both can fire simultaneously.

**§1.1.3 Spending caps boundary**: the cap-to-strict-formula ratio determines the bracket. **Soft caps = up to 2× strict; Low caps = above 2× strict.** When the ratio exceeds 2.0, use Low caps regardless of qualitative impressions about regime quality. Spain's verification caught an agent classifying 2.4× as Soft caps with rationalising prose; the strict-adherence call is Low caps. The brackets are numerical, not qualitative.

#### §1.2 Electoral District Design

Per Scoring Guidelines §3.1.6, classify the country's lower-house and upper-house district systems independently:
- Type 1: drawn districts (apply full framework)
- Type 2: fixed territorial units (states/regions/provinces — alternative scoring per §3.1.6)
- Type 3: not directly elected (don't apply this section; assess under §1.6 distortions instead)

Bicameral weighting: Lower 70% / Upper 30% per §3.1.6.6.

#### §1.3 Parliamentary Vote Counting Methods

Lower house only per Scoring Guidelines. Document the counting method (manual / electronic / mixed) and any verification mechanisms.

#### §1.4 Electoral Threshold

**Applicability gate**: applies only to PR systems, MMP systems where final allocation is proportional, and proportional components of mixed systems (prorated by PR proportion). For pure FPTP / SMD-only systems, this section is **N/A** and its 10% weight is **redistributed proportionally** among other parliamentary components per §3.1.9.

For Germany: 5% threshold applies to the Bundestag (compensatory MMP, fully proportional after 2023 reform). Score normally.

#### §1.5 Presidential Election Voting Methods

**Applicability gate**: applies only to countries with direct presidential election. For systems without (UK, Germany, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, etc.), this section is **N/A** and its 25% weight is **redistributed proportionally** among parliamentary components per §3.1.9.

For Germany: NOT applicable (Bundespräsident elected indirectly by Bundesversammlung). Mark Not applicable; the §1.5 weight redistributes.

#### §1.6 Distortions

Multiple distortion rows. The two recently-split rows are:
- **Distortion — Electoral disproportionality** (§1.3 of Scoring Guidelines): cite the country's Electoral disproportionality special-research file. The file proposes a Gallagher Index value, bracket classification (Minimal / Limited / Severe), and per-chamber penalty. Use the proposed values directly.
- **Distortion — Intentional gerrymandering** (§1.4 of Scoring Guidelines): cite the country's Intentional gerrymandering special-research file. Three classifications per chamber: Not applicable / Not present / Lower–Upper–Both–Single chamber Present.

Other §1.6 rows (Monarch's PM-selection power, Religious authorities' veto, Military veto, Ethnic/traditional leaders' executive veto, Unelected upper house veto/delay, Presidential dissolution of parliament) follow standard classification with the framework spec's enumerated options.

**Pitfalls:**
- The two distortion rows (disproportionality + intent) are independent. A country may show both, neither, or one without the other (USA: Minimal Gallagher 1.9 + Lower house Present; UK: Severe Gallagher 23.7 + Not present).
- Asymmetric chamber pairs use the **max-per-chamber-penalty-value convention**, not the higher-classification convention. Lower Limited + Upper Severe = max(-50, -50) = -50%, not Severe-100%. (Spain 2023: Congreso Minimal + Senado direct-election Severe → max(0, -50) = -50%, encoded as "Upper house — Severe (>15%)".)
- "Not used in practice" produces half the penalty of "used in practice" per the §1.7.1 rule, but only for powers that have a "used in practice" track-record question (monarch PM selection, dissolution, etc.). It does NOT apply to disproportionality or intent.

**§1.6.11 Presidential dissolution four-criteria check** — apply strictly. The No Penalty tier requires *all four* criteria; failing the first one ("specific deadlock situations only") disqualifies even if the other three are met. Corpus precedents:

| Tier | Country | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| **No Penalty** | Germany Article 68 | Failed Vertrauensfrage (Bundestag vote) — explicit deadlock trigger; 4 uses, all BVerfG-validated |
| **No Penalty** | Poland Articles 98/155/225 | Sejm 2/3 self-dissolution / failed PM election after 3 rounds / 4-month budget delay — explicit deadlock triggers |
| **No Penalty** | USA, Mexico, Switzerland, Costa Rica, South Korea | No dissolution power exists |
| **Partial -50%** | Botswana Section 91(1) | President has unilateral discretionary dissolution; "practice has not been to undermine parliament" |
| **Partial -50%** | Spain Article 99.5 + Article 115 | Article 99.5 deadlock-only ✓ but Article 115 PM-initiated discretionary dissolution beyond deadlock; used ~8 times in post-1978 period for non-deadlock snap elections |
| **Full -100%** | (none in current corpus) | Reserved for unilateral-without-checks or used-to-undermine-parliament cases |

A common drift pattern: agent acknowledges the power is "broader than deadlock-only with substantial constraints" and rationalises No Penalty anyway. **That admission contradicts the No Penalty tier criterion #1**. If the constitution allows dissolution at the executive's discretion (subject only to procedural locks like cooldown periods or no-confidence-pending), it is **conditional dissolution beyond deadlock resolution** = Partial -50%, not No Penalty. Procedural locks reduce risk; they do not convert a discretionary power into a deadlock-only one.

### Cat 1 worked example for Germany (completed)

The five Cat 1 special-research files for Germany resolved as:

| Row | Finding | Source |
|---|---|---|
| §1.1.2.1 Foreign-donation Loopholes | Loopholes exist (-25% category-wide penalty) | Foreign donation loopholes special research |
| §1.1.4 Public funding coverage | **Low coverage (30–50%)** — central estimate ~47–49%, near upper bound (corrected during verification from earlier non-spec-bracket "Medium (40–70%)" → strict-spec Low) | Public Funding part 1 |
| §1.1.4 Qualification threshold | 0.5% (bonus fires; <3%) | Public Funding part 2 |
| §1.1.4 Coverage scope | Not applicable (no direct presidential election; halving rule fires structurally via direct_president: No) | Public Funding part 2 |
| §1.5 Presidential voting methods | Not applicable (indirect election; weight redistributes) | Country profile |
| §1.6 Electoral disproportionality | Bundestag Gallagher 6.7 → Minimal; Bundesrat Not applicable | Electoral disproportionality special research |
| §1.6 Intentional gerrymandering | Lower: Not present; Upper: Not applicable | Intentional gerrymandering special research |
| §1.6 Presidential dissolution | No penalty — Article 68 Vertrauensfrage is deadlock-only with parliamentary involvement, judicial review, and substantial limitations and checks | Four-criteria check |

**Cat 1 final score: 0%** (parliamentary penalties at -100% cap floor the category at 0%, driven by foreign-loopholes -25% + corporate non-election -25% + individual no-limit -25% + parliamentary spending no-limits -25% + Bundesrat regional veto -40%).

Other rows required the agent's own research from primary German sources (Parteiengesetz, Bundeswahlgesetz, Grundgesetz, etc.).

---

## Cat 2 — Holding Politicians Accountable (15% of DFI)

### Reading list

1. `Main DFI framework/DFI - accountability 2.docx` — framework spec
2. `New scoring guidelines/DFI - Scoring Guidelines 2 - Accountability.md` (or equivalent) — operational scoring
3. `Special research requests/Accountability institution.md` — methodology for the §2.D bonus
4. The country's `<Country> - Accountability - special research.md` (when complete) → cited at §2.D
5. **Worked exemplar**: Latvia (rich Cat 2: recall + abrogative + RPO equivalent). Or Mexico for the recall-only path.

### Special research integration

The §2.D Accountability institution bonus has its own special-research file. The agent producing the main Cat 2 report should NOT re-investigate the institution from scratch — cite the special-research file's classification (binding +20% / non-binding +10% / does not qualify).

### Common pitfalls

- The §2.D bonus is **single-award**: only the highest-scoring qualifying institution applies; bonuses don't stack.
- An institution must extend to **elected officials**, not just public administration. Sweden's JO and Netherlands' National Ombudsman fail this gate.
- Very-high-signature penalty (-25% in §2.A and §2.B) triggers at **≥10% of registered voters**, not 10% of population.
- Time-restriction penalty brackets (`<30 days` / `30-60 days` / `60-100 days`) use **inclusive lower edges** per the convention.

### Cat 2 worked example for Germany (completed)

Germany resolved as:
- §2.A National recall: existence gate fires (no federal mechanism) → 0%
- §2.B Abrogative referendum: existence gate fires (no federal mechanism) → 0%
- §2.C FOI: IFG (Informationsfreiheitsgesetz) covers federal authorities; one-month response standard; digital free / paper high cost (€0.10/A4 = 0.78% of €12.82 hourly minimum wage); BfDI dedicated oversight body with full independence but recommendations-only powers under §12(3) IFG
- §2.D Bonus: **does NOT qualify** — all four federal candidates (Wehrbeauftragter, Petitionsausschuss, Bundesrechnungshof, BfDI) fail criterion 2 (mandate over elected officials' misconduct). Wehrbeauftragter limited to armed forces; Bundesrechnungshof to financial management; BfDI to data protection / FOI; Petitionsausschuss is a Bundestag committee (not independent). No federal-level general-jurisdiction accountability institution.

**Cat 2 final score: 13.37% / 2.00% DFI contribution.**

The §2.D verification cluster pattern is now established: countries divide into qualifying (Poland RPO, UK PCS — extends to elected officials) vs. non-qualifying (Sweden JO, Netherlands Ombudsman, Germany Wehrbeauftragter, Spain Defensor del Pueblo — all administrative-only mandate, explicit exclusion of elected officials *qua* elected officials). The criterion 2 (mandate-extends-to-elected-officials) test is the universal failure point for the non-qualifying cluster.

---

## Cat 3 — Parliamentary Legislative Initiative (5% of DFI)

### Reading list

1. `Main DFI framework/DFI - parliamentary initiative 3.docx` (current spec; introduces the Distortions sub-component E)
2. `New scoring guidelines/DFI - Scoring Guidelines 3 - Parliamentary Legislative Initiative.md` — especially §3.3.2 Subject-Matter Restrictions
3. **Worked exemplar**: Latvia (10% threshold High Threshold case), Poland (100,000 sigs, Limited restrictions), or Spain (Wide restrictions, ILP under CE Art. 87(3)) for legislative-initiative-existing countries; UK or Norway for existence-gate-fires countries.

No special research applies.

### Subject-matter restriction verification (mandatory for active ILPs)

When the country has an active ILP mechanism (`exists: Yes`), verify whether the implementing statute restricts the **range of legislative domains** citizens may propose:

1. Locate the constitutional and statutory basis (typically a constitutional article + an organic law / implementing statute).
2. Read the exact subject-matter exclusion clause if one exists. Translate the list of excluded matters and document each one in the research file under a "Subject-Matter Exclusions" section.
3. **Constitutional-amendment exclusions don't count.** Most countries reserve constitutional reform to a separate Cat 7 pathway. An ILP that excludes constitutional matters is following the default architectural pattern, not imposing a Cat 3 restriction.
4. Apply the binary classification per §3.3.2 of the Scoring Guidelines:
   - **None** — no domain-based restrictions (or only constitutional reform excluded)
   - **Limited restrictions** (-25% penalty) — only financial/budgetary domains excluded (budget bills, public debt, financial guarantees, fiscal-stability measures, tax matters when bundled with budget rules, loan approvals, executive financial contracts)
   - **Wide restrictions** (-50% penalty) — any non-financial domain excluded (fundamental rights, electoral law, organic-law domains, treaties, planning, royal pardon, etc.)
5. Record the classification verbatim in the YAML's `parliamentary_initiative.distortions.subject_matter_restrictions` row.

The corpus benchmark cases: **Mexico** = None (Article 71: "any matter"); **Poland** = Limited (Article 3 of 1999 law: budget/debt/guarantees only); **Costa Rica** = Limited (Article 123 + Law 8.491: budgetary, tax/fiscal, loan approvals, contracts, administrative acts); **Spain** = Wide (CE Article 87(3) + LO 3/1984: organic laws + tax + international + royal pardon + planning + budget).

### Common pitfalls

- The **existence gate**: when no formal citizen-legislative-initiative mechanism exists, the category short-circuits to 0%; the distortion row is a structural placeholder (use `None`).
- "Petition right" ≠ "legislative initiative." Citizens petitioning Parliament with no obligation for it to consider the petition as a bill does NOT qualify.
- Population-bucket-dependent threshold brackets per General guidelines.
- **Constitutional matters are NOT counted as a restriction.** This is the most common error: a researcher sees an ILP excluding "constitutional reform" and reaches for `Limited` or `Wide`. Constitutional reform is Cat 7 territory; the exclusion is the default pattern, not a Cat 3 distortion.
- The classification is **binary at each level** — if any non-financial domain is excluded, the classification is `Wide` regardless of how many additional restrictions exist. The penalty does not scale with the number of excluded domains.

### Cat 3 for Germany (completed)

Germany has **no federal-level citizen legislative initiative**. The existence gate fired → 0%. Article 76(1) GG enumerates closed list of bill-introduction authority (Bundesregierung, Bundestag fractions / 5% of MPs, Bundesrat); citizens not listed. Bundestag Article 17 GG petition right is the petition-vs-initiative distinction — petition triggers at most committee response or hearing, not bill-deliberation obligation.

The Bundestag e-petition platform's quorum is **30,000 Mitzeichnungen within 6 weeks** (effective 1 July 2024; previously 50,000 within 4 weeks) for *öffentliche Beratung*. Note the verification-stage figure update — older sources still cite the previous threshold; always verify the current figure.

**Cat 3 final score: 0%.**

---

## Cat 4 — Citizens-Initiated Referenda (10% of DFI)

### Reading list

1. `Main DFI framework/DFI - referenda 4.docx`
2. `New scoring guidelines/DFI - Scoring Guidelines 4 - Referenda.md` (or equivalent)
3. **Worked exemplar**: Switzerland (rich case, both legislative + policy types) or Latvia (legislative-only) or UK (existence-gate-fires).

No special research applies.

### Common pitfalls

- Type-conditional weights: legislative-only → 0.80 of category; policy-only → 0.50; both → 0.615 + 0.385. Weights are NOT redistributed when one type is missing — this rewards systems with both pathways.
- §5/§6 boundary: constitutional-court reviewing referendum proposals on constitutional-compatibility grounds is §5 substantive judicial review (-25%), not §6 political veto (-100%). Costa Rica's Sala IV is canonical.
- Approval-quorum boundaries: `>50%` and `≥40-50%` brackets — 50%-exact maps to higher bracket per inclusive-upper-edge convention.

### Cat 4 for Germany (completed)

Germany has **no federal-level binding citizen-initiated referendum** of either type. Both existence gates fired → 0%. Article 20(2) GG sovereignty article + BVerfGE 8, 104 / 96, 231 confirm federal "Abstimmungen" limited to GG-enumerated cases.

The two narrow constitutional exceptions (Article 29 Land-territorial restructuring; Article 146 constitutional replacement) do not qualify because both are top-down (parliament initiates, citizens ratify). Article 29(4) Volksbegehren is a regional sub-step on territorial reorganisation requiring 1/10 of voters in a connected settlement/economic area of ≥1 million inhabitants — structurally restricted, not a freestanding citizen-initiated referendum.

**Verification caught a precision point**: Article 29 Volksbegehren is in paragraph (4), not (6) (a previous draft had this wrong). The 1996 Berlin/Brandenburg merger referendum was held under Article 118a (specific Berlin/Brandenburg merger procedure), not Article 29.

**Cat 4 final score: 0%.**

---

## Cat 5 — Citizens' Assemblies (15% of DFI)

### Reading list

1. `Main DFI framework/DFI - citizens' assemblies 5.docx`
2. The relevant Scoring Guidelines
3. **Worked exemplar**: Netherlands (2 qualifying CAs — Burgerforum 2006, Klimaat 2025) or UK (2 — Social Care 2018, Climate Assembly 2020) for the bonus path; Costa Rica for existence-gate-fires.

No special research applies.

### Common pitfalls

- Bonus path requires **all** of: random-selection sortition, expert input, structured deliberation, advisory output to government. Open public consultations (Botswana's Vision 2036) don't qualify.
- Local-level assemblies don't count for the national-level bonus.
- **Direct DFI contribution**: bonus is 1pp (one assembly) or 3pp (two or more), bypasses the standard category × weight formula.

### Cat 5 for Germany (completed; reference for similar cases)

Germany held **four national-level Bürgerräte** between 2019 and 2024:
- Bürgerrat Demokratie 2019 — NGO-organised (Mehr Demokratie e.V. + Schöpflin Stiftung), Bundestagspräsident patronage → **does NOT qualify**
- Bürgerrat Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt 2020-2021 — Bundestagspräsident-commissioned ("im Auftrag des Bundestagspräsidenten") → **qualifies**
- Bürgerrat Klima 2021 — NGO-organised, ex-officio patronage by former Bundespräsident Köhler → **does NOT qualify**
- Bürgerrat Ernährung im Wandel 2023-2024 — Bundestag Einsetzungsbeschluss under §56a GO-BT → **qualifies**

Result: **2 qualifying assemblies → +3pp DFI bonus**.

The verification surfaced a controlling methodology principle: **the §3.4.3 standard is initiation, not reception**. The Scoring Guidelines were updated during this verification to make the distinction explicit and to use Bürgerrat Demokratie 2019 / Bürgerrat Klima 2021 as the canonical non-qualifying examples (NGO + state patronage + reception pattern), and Bürgerrat Ernährung im Wandel 2023-24 as the canonical qualifying §56a-commissioned example. See `notes/spec-issues.md` for the full audit trail.

For other countries: apply the initiation-vs-reception test strictly. Patronage and reception, even when combined, do not convert a civil-society-initiated assembly into a government-initiated one. Only actual initiation (commissioning, mandating, funding, formal establishment by a national public authority) qualifies. The Irish Citizens' Assembly model (Oireachtas-commissioned) is the canonical qualifying anchor.

---

## Cat 6 — Safeguards (15% of DFI)

### Reading list

1. `Main DFI framework/DFI - safeguards 6.docx`
2. The relevant Scoring Guidelines
3. **Worked exemplar**: South Korea (hand-verified at 62.67%) for a standard main path; Norway/Sweden for dual-system Media; UK for "no separate Constitutional Court — Supreme Court fulfils CC role."

No special research applies.

### Common pitfalls

- **Constitutional Court existence gate**: if no separate CC exists, two readings — spec-strict (score 0/40) or functional (score the body that fulfils the role). YAML author must pick one and document.
- **Dual-system averaging is authorized only for Media**. Other sub-components require a single representative classification.
- §6.0.1 sub-component weights table sums to 15% (2+2+2+2+4+3). An earlier version of the table had a typo in the total cell ("14%"); this was corrected during the Germany Cat 6 verification cycle. Both the Scoring Guidelines and the Builder use 15%.

### Cat 6 for Germany (completed; reference for similar cases)

Germany's six Cat 6 sub-components resolved as:
- **Judges**: Career Judiciary Model (13 pts) — framework spec lists Germany as the example
- **Media** (dual-system averaging): Statutory Public Corporation 18 + Independent Commission 16 ÷ 2 = 17 pts — framework spec uses Germany as the worked dual-system example
- **Electoral Commission**: Ministry-Led Electoral Administration (6 pts) — framework example assignment to Parliamentary Supermajority Model is factually inapplicable to BWahlG §9 (Bundeswahlleiterin appointed by BMI, never by parliamentary supermajority); resolved per §3.7.1 strict-adherence; logged in `notes/spec-issues.md`
- **Prosecutor General**: Executive Appointment with Legislative Confirmation (6 pts) — Generalbundesanwalt under GVG §149
- **Constitutional Court Nomination**: Multi-Source Nomination System (16 pts) — framework spec lists Germany explicitly
- **Constitutional Court Selection**: Multi-Stakeholder Selection (16 pts) — Bundestag 2/3 + Bundesrat 2/3 parallel tracks
- **Election Results Validation**: Supreme/Constitutional Court Model (14 pts) — Article 41 GG + BVerfG appeal; framework spec lists Germany explicitly

**Cat 6 total: 9.50% of total DFI / 63.33% of category weight.**

Two methodology lessons from this category:
- **§6.0.1 sub-component weights table sums to 15%** (corrected during verification; earlier "14%" total cell was a typo). Both the Scoring Guidelines and the Builder use 15%.
- **Framework example assignments don't override §3.7.1 strict-adherence when the example is factually wrong**. Germany's Bundeswahlleiterin example was inapplicable from the start; §3.7.2 binds only "unless there has been a documented constitutional change since the framework was developed." Where there's no change to document because the example never matched the law, §3.7.1 (definition over reputation) controls.

---

## Cat 7 — Ability to Change the Constitution (15% of DFI)

### Reading list

1. `Main DFI framework/DFI - changing the constitution 7.docx`
2. `New scoring guidelines/DFI - Scoring Guidelines 7 - Constitution.md` (or equivalent)
3. **Worked exemplar**: Switzerland (highest scorer, rich citizen pathways), Japan (Article 96 mandatory referendum), or Norway (parliamentary-only path).

No special research applies.

### Common pitfalls

- "Simple majority in both chambers" placeholder option (45%, pending calibration). Logged in `notes/spec-issues.md`.
- Penalties are **multiplicative**, not additive. Worked example: 65% × (1 - 0.5) = 32.5% for a present-but-unused monarch veto.
- "Eternity clauses" require **textual unamendability**. Provisions that merely raise the bar don't count.
- "Used in practice over 100 years" is binary, not hedged-frequency.

### Cat 7 for Germany (completed; reference for similar cases)

Germany's Article 79 GG: 2/3 Bundestag + 2/3 Bundesrat amendment requirement. Resolution:
- **Initiation methods**: parliamentary (Bundestag fractions) + executive (Bundesregierung) + federal-regional (Bundesrat representing the Länder); no citizen pathway, no preliminary referendum
- **Process type**: Parliamentary process (no constituent assembly, no citizens' assembly, no formal expert commission with drafting authority)
- **Approval mechanism**: Federal System (Central Parliament ≥2/3 + Majority of States) — framework spec lists Germany explicitly as the canonical example
- **Eternity clause distortion**: **Not present** for both elite-privileges and anti-democratic-structures sub-rows. Article 79(3) is textually unamendable, but it protects (i) federal-arrangement principles (Länder existence, Land participation in legislation — explicitly excluded by the Scoring Guidelines clarification on legitimate power-balancing federal features) and (ii) Articles 1 and 20 GG (human dignity, democracy, rule of law, social state — pro-democratic principles, *opposite* of "elite privileges" or "anti-democratic structures"). Neither sub-prong of the framework's -70% eternity-clause penalty is met.
- **Other distortions**: Republic (no monarch); secular state (no religious veto); civilian military control (no military veto); Bundesrat 2/3-veto on amendments captured under approval mechanism (not as separate distortion per power-balancing-federal-features clarification).

**Cat 7 total: 6.62% of total DFI / 44.15% of category weight.**

Lessons:
- **Eternity clauses require BOTH textual unamendability AND protection of elite-privilege or anti-democratic structures.** A textually unamendable clause that protects pro-democratic principles or federal arrangements does NOT trigger the -70% penalty per the Scoring Guidelines clarification.
- **Federal-system approval is captured at the approval mechanism row**, not as a separate "unelected upper house veto" distortion. When the framework spec lists the country explicitly under "Federal System (≥2/3 + Majority of States)", that is the operative classification — the federal-unit veto is constitutive of the approval mechanism, not a distortion of it.

---

## Output specification

### File location and naming

For country `<Country>`:
- **Main per-category report**: `Countries - results/<Country>/Research/<Country> - <Category> - report.md`
- The `<Category>` token uses the framework's category name with single hyphens, capitalized: Elections, Accountability, Parliamentary Initiative, Referenda, Citizens Assemblies, Safeguards, Constitution.

Example for Germany:
```
Countries - results/Germany/Research/Germany - Elections - report.md
Countries - results/Germany/Research/Germany - Accountability - report.md
Countries - results/Germany/Research/Germany - Parliamentary Initiative - report.md
Countries - results/Germany/Research/Germany - Referenda - report.md
Countries - results/Germany/Research/Germany - Citizens Assemblies - report.md
Countries - results/Germany/Research/Germany - Safeguards - report.md
Countries - results/Germany/Research/Germany - Constitution - report.md
```

### Length expectations

Approximate per-category length (markdown source):
- Cat 1 Elections: 60-120 KB / 2,000-4,000 lines (largest, with §1.1 sub-rows + §1.6 distortions)
- Cat 2 Accountability: 30-60 KB / 1,000-2,000 lines
- Cat 3 Parliamentary Initiative: 8-20 KB / 300-700 lines (or shorter when existence gate fires)
- Cat 4 Referenda: 30-60 KB / 1,000-2,000 lines (or shorter when both types' existence gates fire)
- Cat 5 Citizens' Assemblies: 20-40 KB / 600-1,500 lines
- Cat 6 Safeguards: 50-80 KB / 1,500-2,500 lines (six independent sub-components)
- Cat 7 Constitution: 30-60 KB / 1,000-2,000 lines

These are rough guidelines. Quality over length; if a 200-line Cat 3 file fully captures the existence-gate finding with primary-source citations, that's correct.

### Internal structure

Top-level structure mirrors the framework spec's section numbering (§1.1, §1.2, §1.3, etc.). Each row in the framework spec gets its own subsection with the four required subsections (RESEARCH FINDINGS / LEGAL BASIS / SOURCE / PROPOSED CLASSIFICATION).

Lead with a **Country profile** section that captures the cross-cutting facts (population, minimum wage, constitutional system) so the YAML author can find them at a glance. End with a **Sources** section listing all cited primary documents with URLs.

### Citing special-research files

When a row's classification comes from a special-research file, cite it explicitly:

```
**PROPOSED CLASSIFICATION**: Loopholes exist (-25% penalty, capped)

**RATIONALE**: Per `Countries - results/<Country>/Special research/<Country> - Foreign donation loopholes - special research.md`, the foreign-donation prohibition has [specific gap]. See special-research file §X.Y for the full investigation.
```

### Uncertainty notes

Where a classification is genuinely ambiguous, use the General guidelines standardized format. Don't bury uncertainty — surface it clearly so the YAML author and verification agent can review the call.

---

## Verification handoff

Once the per-category report is drafted, it goes through verification (Phase 6 of the README workflow) before YAML scaffolding. The verification agent applies `Research guidelines/DFI - Verification of Research Guidelines.md` to confirm:
- All framework spec rows are addressed
- Direct legal quotes are present in LEGAL BASIS subsections
- Citations resolve to authoritative sources
- Special-research files are correctly referenced for the relevant rows
- Classifications use exact spec options (no invented intermediate scores)
- Uncertainty notes follow the General guidelines format

If verification surfaces errors, return to the relevant row, revise, and re-verify.

---

## Adapting this guide for other countries

To use this guide for a country other than Germany:

1. Replace the country profile with the new country's facts.
2. Replace the worked-example references with the structurally closest corpus country.
3. Confirm the special-research file inventory in the country's `Special research/` folder before citing.
4. Adapt the per-category preview sections to reflect the new country's institutional realities.

The cross-cutting prerequisites, framework references, methodology files, output format, and pitfall lists do not change country to country.
